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"It is true that the moral consoiouness 
of the world must recognize the importance of 
removing injusti ces and well- founded grievances, 
but at the same t i me it must be aroused to the 
cardinal necessity of honoring sancti ty of 
treaties, of respecting the rights and 
liberties of others and putting an end to 
acts of international aggression~" 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
Chicago 1937 
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CHAPTER I 
I NTRODUCTION 
I n presenting an interpretive evaluation of our China 
policy it is necessary t o have an understanding of t he 
historical and political background of China just previous to 
and during the years from 1945 to 1950, as ell as an under-
standing of the precepts whi ch governed the thinking of the 
Chinese leaders at that time ~ 
Much of my evaluation i s based on the fac t that I lived 
and taught in China for t wo of the years I have covered in 
1/ 
my thesis .- Before going to China I was ss~pathetic ~ith 
the a grarian reforms the Chinese Communists had inaugurated 
and it was not easy to change my beliefs and frames of 
references. T o years in China proved to me t hat Chinese 
Communists were erecting a bamboo cur tain to hide from t he 
Western world t heir affiliations wi t h Russia and orld wide 
Communism, instead of a desire to i mitate and emulate y 
America as Mr. Owen Lattimore maintained. 
Although the basic sims of America•s post- ar policy in 
the Far East have remained t he same, the implementation of 
t hat policy has been altered several times in the past five 
Y Assistant Professor in Foreign Language Department, Natioml 
Shantung University, Tsingtao, China, March 1947 - Jan.l949 
~/ Lattimore, Owen - Ordeal by Slander, P • 43· 
years by the course of' events in changing strife-torn Asia. 
I n the succeeding pages I have attempted to picture the 
sequence o:t' poli cy shifts in · accordanc e with events as they 
happened and with thei!' meanings as they ~ere later explained . 
The fact that there are t iV.O differing opinions on the 
best course of ac tion in the Far Eas t is not to be denied . 
The main differences are those of policy and action i n or-
moea and the Far East . One side accepts the revolution in 
China as somethlng that must be accepted and lived il'i t h and 
believes that the best chance of peace in Asia lay in seeking 
every means to drive a wedge between Red China and Russia . 
They do not believe in supporting Chiang Kai - shek in an in-
vasion of the Chinese mainland . There are other's who,like 
General MacArthur, believe in givi~g fUll support to those 
Chinese who oppose the Mao Tse ... ·tung regime . 
The danger of a Communist victory i n China had been 
foreseen for a good many years by China specialists bot h 
inside and outside the govern.ment. Formulation of American 
pol icy to forestall such a vict;ory, ho ever , has depended on 
condition in the United States as well as in China.. 
Our Chi na pqli cy became involved in a disastrous duality . 
We urged that; reforms were the only \: ay to forestall Corumuniam 
yet at the same time kept givi ng aid to Chiang Kai - s hek . 
These alternatives were by nature mutually incompatible, but 
we became i nvolved in trying both at once ~ This was becauee 
our pol icy makere in the various bttanches of government 
represented a variety of vie\"/S. 
I t is true there was indisputable need in Asi a for 
a grarian reforms, f or nationalisti c awakening, for an end to . 
colonialism, for jus tice and f reedom, but there were other 
forces in China other than Chiang Kai - shek whom the United 
States coul d have suppor•tad . Nationalists like Yeh Chen .. ying 
i n Canton and Chen Yi in Shanghai , neither a Chiang Kai - shek 
man . They cou l d have been the leaders of a 11 third force" of 
democratic, freedom-loving Chinese r esis ·tance . 
I n vi ew of its consistent inconsistency it is diffi cult , 
even for the least prejudiced observer, t;o gues s what the 
present American policy in the Far East may be . It would 
seem to be predicated upon the need for the ra.pid reconstruc -
tion of Japan a.s a major power to serve as a counterweight to 
the Soviet Union i n the Far East, although the perilous un-
certaini ties i n such a ~olicy are most apparent . .lliatever the 
policy is , it was certainl y not t he policy in 1945 . The 
policy at that time was to make China united and strong so 
that neither the Soviet Union nor any other alien po1er could 
dominate her. The poli cy was t o achieve t hat ob jective by 
supporting the Nationalis t Government of Chiang Kai - shek . 
That policy since 1946 was ignored , and it as finally rele-
3 
gated to limbo when General Marshall, as Secretary of State in 
1947, ignored General Wedemeyer's recommendations that the 
United States gi11e all - out support to the Chiang Kai - shek 
government . 
President Roosevelt felt that China s hould be the keys tone 
in the arch of Asia. To him the best ·1ay to g et; a unified and 
strong post- ar China was to do what we could to support the 
Nationalist Government and to make sure that all forei n 
powers respected her independence and integrity in harmony 
with our traditional Open Door Policy . 
It has been the reversal of that decision that has con-
tributed greatly to the disastrous course of events in the Far 
East during the past four years . 
The United States failed to face the facts of life in 
Asia . This was ·true in two ways! we failed to appreciate 
that Chiang Kai - shek was a political factor in this phase of 
Asia •s growth and our most important ally; we also failed to 
reali ze that his government would eventually come to include 
younger men with ideas and broader vision . If e had under-
atood this evolution we could have given help and counsel. 
However , we refused Chiang enough effective support to enable 
China to progress and a t the same time just enough for his 
Communist enemies to brand Chiang as a tool of American 
imperialism . 
The most difficult fact Ameri.ca has to face is that the 
4 
world is not made in the American image. We must accept the 
fact that Asia is a continent run by oligarchs and we must 
deal with them, with all their prejudices and, second ly, wa 
must not think · t here is any permanent policy of handling the 
political actions of Asia , f'or this continent of Asia and its 
oligarchs are going to keep changing fast and e ill have to 
change with them . 
5 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL EVALUATION 
Concrete assurance of American interest in China was 
indicated by the urgent way in whi ch the United States acted 
in the granting of extensive financial assistance to Chung-
king, the Nationalist capital. I n February 1942, President 
Roosevelt brought China ts need to the attent ion of Congress . 
Enclosed with the President 'S letter was a draft of a 
joint resolution which the President urged Congress to pass, 
authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval 
of the President, to loan or extend credit or give other 
financial aid to China in an amount not to exceed 
500,000,000. The joint resolution was promptly passed by 
Congress and signed by the President , F'ebru.ary 7, 1942. Less 
than a week later the money for this aid was voted by Congress 
This extensive credit was fol lowed on June 2 , 1942 with 
the conclusion of a mutual aid agreement with China . The 
extension of monetary aid in the form of large line of credit, 
and the extension of direct aid in supplies and equipment, 
deeply committed the United States to the support of the 
Nationalist Government . 
The relinquishing of extraterritorial rights in China in 
October 1942 indicated a desire to improve Sino-Americah re-
-6-
lations. The final treaty was si gned January 11, 1943 and 
marked this end of special rights in China for the United 
States~ and stipulat ed that Ame rican Nationals in t ha t country 
s hall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Chi nese government. 
The treaty was actually an international tribute to Chinese 
sovereignty and an implied pledge for restitution of' Chinese 
control over what was then occupied territory. 
Americans were in agreement on the need to maintain China 
as a major Pacific ally . Di fferences arose in regard to t he 
nature and terms of t he aid to b e given to China . 
The situation was complicated by the existence during the 
war, years of three Chinas . Occupied China , ruled by the 
Japanes e and puppet Chinese; Free China controlled by the 
nationalist Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai -shek 
and who was recognized as the official s pokesman for the 
country ; Communist and guerilla areas operated under their 
own government and laws and maintained t heir own armies . 
This group contained about ninety million people. 
The policy i n regard to Occupied China was to defeat and 
drive out the Japanese. It was fe l t that the greates t effort 
against the Chinese could be made by a United China, including 
Kuomintang and Communist area$. The basic question of 
American Policy in China was whether the Nationalist govern-
ment should receive unconditional aid and outri ght American 
support. The alternative was to make the aid contingent upon 
7 
the establishment of a coalition government representing 
Kuomi ntang, Communists and other elements in Chinese poli tical 
life. The extenslon of the f:i500,000,000 line of credit s hortl:Y 
after our entrance into the war committed the United States to 
the support of the Nationalist government . Later , American 
policy stressed t he coali t ion program to varying degrees, de-
pending on pressure at h ome, and partly on a mili tary estimate 
of the r e lative effectiveness of t he two groups against the 
Chinese. Official stat ements stressed the need for unity in 
China, but an uneasy truce, often breaking into open conflict, 
was all that was achieved. 
Pressure for increased aid to China continued to be ex-
er ted from many sources . Wende ll L. Wilkie in October 1942 
called for all out United Nations offensive everywhere . The 
remark by President Roosevelt i n his e.nnual message to Congress 
on January 7, 19L~3 that '•today we are flying as much lend-lease 
material i nto China as ever traversed t he Burma road" brought 
a flood of questions . Regardle.ss of the specific explanations 
offered, it was admitted in all quarters that help to China 
in tenns of material was very 11 ttle. 
The situation remained tense within China and civil con-
flicts between t he ;Ku omi ntang and Communist forces continued 
on into November 1943. Under the leadership of Ambassador 
Clarence E . Gauss and Lieutenant G·eneral Joseph Stilwell , the 
United States continued to press for a peaceful and democratic 
8 
solution of the internal problems in China . Meanwhile, in 
ot her aspects of American Policy, our i nteres t in promoting 
China to a posi tion of one of the great powers of the world 
was shaping up. 
Our policy was a pparent i n the prominent role given to 
China i n international discussions and in the new or gani za t ionJI 
I' 
formed during t he war. China was a party of the f our-p o er r 
declaration on General Security issued .from :Moscow in 1943, 
and the three-power conference at Cairo later t hat same year, 
which pled ged restoration to China of Manchuria , Formosa and 
the Pescodores. A prominent part was assigned to Chinese 
represen tatives at the U. N.R.R.A. conference, and s he partie-
ipated in t he i mportant d iscussion on the international organ -
i .zation he l d at Dunbarton Oaks. 
A long-standing i n justice was ri ghted when President 
Roosevelt signed an Act removing legislat ive discrimination 
a gainst Chinese i n t he United States i n December 1943. The 
Chinese exclusion laws were repealed, an annual Chinese 
i mmigration quota established, and legally Chinese became 
eligible to be naturalized American citizens . 
Concern on t h e part of the United States that the :I.n-
ternal situation of China mi ght cont ain exp l osive elements 
effecting United States-u. s .S . R. relations was ind icated by a 
trip taken by Vice - Pres ide nt Harry A. Wallace in 1944· Mr. 
Wallace went as personal representative of Pr•esident Rooseve lt 
9 
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and visited key places in Soviet Aeia and in China. 
Wallace stated on his ret.urn that before making substan-
tial investments in China, American business will want to b e 
certain "that there is no likelihood of conflict within China 
or between China and the U. s . s . R." 
The difficulties of the American position of supporting 
the Nati onalist regime , while at the same time seeking unity 
in China, became more apparent late in 1944. The primacy of 
one or the other motive had to be indicated . I n September 
1944, Donald !11 . Nelson, then Chairman of the War Production 
Board,an.d Major General Patrick J. Hurley arrived in Chungking 
to discuss economic and military problems . 
The recall of General Stilwell in October 1944 at the 
re quest of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and the later 
resignation of Clarence E. Gauss , ~~erican Ambassador to China 
since 194.1, showed the order of priority of our objectives in 
China. Although the United States hoped for unity, it would 
not renounce its support of the Nationalist government as a 
preliminary for achieving such settlement. 
Fear lest the internal conflicts in China might result in 
American-Soviet disagreement with each power backing different 
sides i n the event of civil war was relaxed by the thirty-
year treaty between China and the Soviet Union in August 194~ 
!/ Appendix D 
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In all areas in the Pae1t1c theatre , the sudden end o:r 
the ar h d important politic 1 repercussions.. In hina , the 
fact th t r ended had important pol! tical reperoussi ons •. 
The .fact th t ar ended . ithout the J a .. a.neae being de!' ated 
on Chinese s oil , lthout large seal~ land fi ghting , with no 
critical test f a:r•mies , Kuomintane; or Cormuun1 s t , in close 
con tact Nith .1\.merican .forces , m a.n t a d1.t'f1cult poll tical 
i tua ti on . Puppet Chinese, a l igned i th the Jape.neae, simply 
s 1 tched to the winning side .. .Tapanese .force ordered to 
urrender only to Nationalist troops were used to- hol d off 
the loc 1 Chinese Communists. 
President Truman ' s statement expressed the general out-
g) 
line of American Policy . It :reoognl z~d the Nati onal Gove rn·-
ment a:;; the only legal g overnment in China , but stnted that 
1 ts poll tical face should b e broadened to inc l ude all parties 
and the armi e should be incor porated in n .tional army under 
a new representative government . The United States di vowed 
any form of intervention except that financial aid ~Vould be 
granted for Chines projects as "Chi na .. oves toward pe ce nd 
unity'• . 
This he l ps to explain why the controlling groups in the 
Kuomintang and the Communist parti es refused t o cooperate and 
General Marshall's mission was doomed to failure before he 
went to China. :J/ 
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The Chinese people have a long and deeply-rooted tra-
dition of government~ the people but certainly not £z t he ! 
peopl e. This authoritarian tradit ion was demonstrated in the 
party dictatorship of both the Kuomintang and the Communists. 
' The Communists were successful in their efforts to d raw an 
official class from the peasantry as a gainst t he Kuomintang ta 
effort, whose policies of educational control indicated an 
11 attempt to keep alive the cleavage between the s cholar and 
the peasant and Chiang Kai-shek gained the reputation from 
!ll 
I' 
the Wes t of being a facist. 
I n the past the Chinese have attempted to retain the 
core of their traditional social and political structure 
while westernizing their material life. Since the beginning 
of the twentieth century they have tried to break with the 
past and to substitute for Confucian social control, the 
political and · legal philosophy and structural reforms of 
I 
:I 
II 
I' 
I 
,1 Western government, with its concept of the nation-s tate . 
When, in 1945, there was an end to the hostilities of 
1 World War II , China was faced with a civil war and with tas~e l· I 
of reconstruction· and in many respects more involved than II 
t he major war , issue of resistance versus appeasement of ~~ 
Japan . These tasks were not primarily a result of the war, 1 
but rather the product of China •s unfinished revolution. t he !l 
product of t he Western impact on China. 
YJ Appendix A 
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Inspite of the united front during Worl d War II the re-
lations between the Kuomintang and the Communists political 
leaders was exceedingly bitter . Even during the struggle 
against Japan China was on the brink of civil war . The end 
of World War II merely brought the realities of civil war 
closer. 
Although during the late war China was accorded the 
position of a great po er, her status was nominal rather than 
real . Her political weakness has been a constant invitation 
to predatory powers. The policies of the United States and 
Russia played a large part in the final outcome of the civil 
war in China. The concessions made to Russia by the United 
States at Yalta were indicative of an inter-play between two v §./ 
big powers and the subsequent Sino-Soviet Treaty . 
The Communists fought the Japanese when their own polit-
ical tactic a required .it; t hey never .supported a mill tary 
strategy. The Nationalists had the intricate job of fi ghting 
both as Na tionalists , for their party, and as Chinese,for 
their government . Chiang Kai -shek bore the weight of main-
taining Chinats international unity. 
During World War II, the Nationalis t leaders .wanted to 
be recogni zed by the Chinese people and by the world as 
officers of .the Chinese state, but on the other hand, they 
~ Appendix C [1/ Appendix D 
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wanted to fulfill the party goals. They were willing to solve 
the Communist issue by political means, but they appeared to 
the Communists to arra]Je the government to insure their own 
continuation in power. 
The Communists were just as contradictory. They demanded 
the military unity of China, but attempted to ge t govern~ent 
troops to desert to their side. The Communists demanded par-
ticipation in the life of the Chinese State but denied the 
existence of such a state. 
The core of the issue in Chinese politics was, " is there 
a state in China or not'•. If ther e was a state Chiang Kai-she 
was the lawful commander-in-chief and the Communists ere 
rebels and the law of the land shoul d have settled . the 
question. The Nationalists argument was that the state exi ste 
i during the war and that the Communists could not reco~nize 
their own National Chinese State without subjecting themselves 
to its authority. 
L 
Chinese politics, in the domestic sense, was wholly 
subordinate to the poll tics imposed upon China by the two 
Great Powers. The Chinese State, if it existed, was repre-
s.ented by the Nationalist-controlled, internationally recog-
nized government; but the Chinese State, though recogni zed, 
was not substantial enough to hold the strategic vacuum be-
tween t he United States and Russia. The Americans were 
1J People •s Consultative Council 
) 
lj 
unprepared to accept the responsibility and costs for extending 
Chinese government authority to the territorial limits o£ 
"China" . They were unprepared to drall' an identifiable bound• 
ary between Anglo-American and Russian power. 
The Communists and the Na tionalis ts atched the progress 
of the United States armed for ces across the Pacific and the 
supplies fi ltering over the hump bobh for different reaaone . 
The Communists hoped the Americans would land on the Northern 
Coast and arm huge Communist forces . Then Chiang Kai - shek 
could be "democrati zed" with American support. They received 
a great d eal of sympathy f rom General Stilwell and his staff. 
At this period a great many Americans felt that the Chinese 
Communists were not "real communists" in the sense of Soviet 
Communism but rather agrarian reformers . 
The Na t ionalis ts also wanted to use America to rin the 
civil war . The Nationalists wanted the United States to 
recognize the Chinese state by equipping them in such measure 
as to assure mi litary supremacy . They wanted weapons, credits, 
international support, first to fight the Japanese and then 
to ''maintain order"~ 
. §/ 
At the Yalta Conference the United States destroyed 
most of the strategic potential of the Nationalists and in-
sisted that the National ists confirm the arrangements by 
:zJ 
agreements with Russia. Chinese Nationalist consen t was 
W Appendix C 
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guaranteed in advance by President Roosevelt. The .fact that 
the Jap anese occupied Manchuria, t ha t the Russian army might 
be needed if the Japanese staged .a large offensive on the 
con tinent, and that area was outside the strategic United 
States zone impelled the United States policy . to~ard these 
.!21 
arrangements. 
With Russia inside Manchuria, Nationalist h opes for 
unification of China began to f'ade. Nationalist a gents and 
spies had subverted the Manchurian army. Chiang Kai - shek had 
counted on the conversion of' this army to his side. He hoped. 
that the treaty with Russia would keep the Soviet government 
out of Chinats internal conflict. They trusted the "legality'* 
of thei r government in the community of nations for protection 
against a major Soviet invasion. 
Russia•s intervention i n Manchuria achieved several ends. 
1. They affiliated themselves with Chinese Communis t s 
headquarters in Yenan. 
2. They looted the industry of Manchuria. The 
Chinese had hoped to use Manc-huria as an 
economic base. 
). The vast military supplies of the Japanese in 
~~churia were taken over by Chinese Communists 
and so re-equipped by t he Russians on a larger 
scale than American military aid to t he Nationalist 
These supplies in Manchuria could have been used 
by the Nationalists to gain national military 
supremacy and unity in Chinese government hands. 
This turning over military supplies in Manchuria by the 
~ Sherwood, Robert E. , Roosevelt and Hopkins . 
==- =--·-
16 
I 
I 
-~--J---- - ,~ 
Russians despite the treaty pledge that Russia would only 
lll give aid to the Chinese Government. 
The American Government did not recognize these actions 
as intervention. It did however disrupt the Chinese Governmen 
plan for Nationalist military superiority over the Communists, 
which would have allowed Chiang Kai .. s hek to bargai n on 
political terms. 
In the autumn of 1945 and the spring of 1946, the 
Americans rendered substantial aid to the Chinese Government. 
Chinese troops were transported to the North by air and by 
sea ... going vessels. A Chinese Government force was delivered 
to Manchuria. This prevented Russo~Chinese Communist occupa~ 
tion of the northern half of China proper. The surrender of 
the Japanese troops was made in North China to Chiang Kai -shek 
and the Americans prevented more t han a million Japanese from 
en tering the Chinese civil war .Chiang Kai ~shek regained in 
China, through the Americans, a fraction of what he lost in 
Manchuria to Russia. The Russians realized that an over-
extension of the Communists military periphery would eventuall 
meet American counter•concentration power, 
The first practical step toward unity between the 
Kuomintang and the Communists and minor parties occurred on 
19.4c.W September 28, / When General Patrick Hurley induced 
Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Communist party, to visit Chiang 
I 
~~ 
I 
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Kai - shek . Hurley later occurred Communist hatred by accepting 
the thesi s that a Chinese state did exis t and that the Chinese 
Government was t he fina l authoritative representati ve of t ha t 
a tate. No results cam.e from these talks . 
I n December 1945 when Pres id ent Truman appointed General 
George c . Marshall as Special Envoy to China, he stated the 
.w United States aims . These aims were ambiguous but received 
w 
approval at the 1osco~ meeting of f orei gn ministers . 
When Marshall arri ved in China in December he found the 
Chinese had adjusted their polit ics to the wis hes of the Great 
Powers . The Political Consultative Confere nce was ready to 
be convened . The P. c. c . represented an extreme ac t of self-
denial on the part of both Na tionalists and Communists, since 
these t wo large parties permitted the controlling vote t o 
pass to persons representing very little . 
The most important act of the P. C. C. was the freezing 
w 
of military positions by the a greement of January 10 , 1946 
whereby a Conunittee of three ... Kuomintang, Communists and 
Americans - undertook the stopping of t he civil war . Troops 
on both sides 1ere to maintai n positions . The Communists 
promised not to i n terfere ~ith lines of communications and 
admi tted the govern.'llent r s right to occupy Manchuria . These 
two promises were never kept . 
I ~ Xppendlx B l Appendix A !2/ Appendix A 
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The Communists and the Nationalists also agreed on the 
Constitution . The Constitution was a modification of the 
f irst drafts in line with Communist desires. The Communists 
denounced it as reactionary when it was proclaimed . 
The Pe ople •s Consultative Council was a failure as was 
General Marshall's mi ss ion . Each s ide kept shifting there-
sponsibility to the other trying to oblige their American 
mediator. 
Sinc e no worldwide Communist ... democratic coaliti on pre-
vailed at that time, General Marshall was, of course, unable 
to effec t in broken , bankrupt, fact.ional China that dream of 
Communist-democratic working uni ty which could not be created 
outs ide . His fairness, jud gment and experience kept alive 
II 19 
' 
the illusion of hope long after the practical basis for 
settlement disappeared . He could neither coalesce two factions 
- each bitter with twenty-five years of' provocation and be-
trayal by t he other - nor was he authorized to divide China 
between them . The Nationalists could not concede the Com-
rnunists a final veto in the Chinese government; the Communists 
could feel themselves safe with nothing less . 
With partition excluded by American policy, and coalition 
impossible because of global Communist-democratic tensions 
I. 
I 
which applied in China no less than elsewhere, General l ,arshal ' 
sought to solve and obtain a definitive agreement with V1orld 
communism on the China ques tion . He had been given the t ask , 
by President Truman , of effecting an informal American-Sovie t 
condominium in China. This arrangement was presumably de -
signed to keep China out of' either the exclusively-American 
or exclusively•Russion s trategic zone and would create a s tronJ 
unified d emocratic country by adjusting the Chinese gove r nment 
i n such a way as to make it a happy and effectual Communist -
democratic coalition. 
F1rom the beginning , there was no pros pec t that the 
Chinese communists would regard the United States Government 
as a proper guar dian or interpreter of the Comm:Uniat cause in 
the Far East . Save for a fe relief supplies, General Marshal 
bad not hing to give the Communists . His authority could 
penalize or weaken the Chinese Government , but it did not ex• 
tend to the Cowfiunists. He was in the position of bargaining 
bet ·een the Chinese Government and one of its own parties, 
but having influence only on one side. He sought to solve the 
issue by seeking uthird partie.f.l" in China which might bridge 
the gulf between Sun-Yat•senism and Marxi sm ; he turned to the 
minor parties . Faced wi ·t;h a s tal emate President Truman on 
December 18, 1946 said 'th e United States would continue 
mediation bu t wotild not interfere in uinternal affairs in 
China11 • 
General Marshall came back to the United States in 
Januar y 1947 to become Secretary of State and blamed both sides 
20 
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I for the fai l ure of peace mission . The nactive mediation" 
phase of our policy in China was over . 
The United States vas dissatisfied with Chiang Kai -shek 
but fe lt it could not alter the course of events without ful l - ! 
scale intervention . 
I n October 1946 Chiang Kai - shek made his last offer to 
the Communists. They ignored him and he proceeded to estab-
lish a multi -part gover~~ent without them . Wi th the adoption 
of the constitution on January 26 , 1946 and the announcement 
of fUll elect ive democracy f or January 25 , 1947, the c ivil 
war returned • 
The JCuomintang had been in power a long time . When 
General Marshall left China, it resumed its pre - eminence in 
Chinese affairs . I ts leaders were over- age . It had frozen 
its doctrine into an orthod oxy. Officially dedicated to 
democracy by the precepts of Sun Yat - sen the Kuomintang was 
also charged with governing China until the country was ready 
for democracy . 
Lieutenant; General Albert C. Wedemeyer went to China 
. 1Y 
and Korea on a fact finding mission in July 1947 • His sub-
sequent report was critical of the Nationalists and warn ed of 
Sovi e t aggression . It also urged that economic aid t o the 
Nationalists be continued under certain controls , ~i th Chiang 
Kai - shek accepting supervision of his armed forces . 
1§7 Appendix G 
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The probl em of Chi na grew more acute , the Na tional i s t 
f or ce s were los i ng ground to the Communis ts . At this time 
President Truman under pr essure f rom Congres s as ked for ·~5'70 ];]} 
million for economic aid f or the Na t i onalis ts . 
I n Apr i l of 1949 the National i s ts were preparing to with-
draw to For mosa . The Communis ts had by thi s t i me captured the 
Na ti onali s t •s capi tal , Nanki ng . 
I n order to clear up the misapprehe ns ion , di storti on and 
misunder standing in the Unit ed St ates i n regard to our pol icy 
toward China , the Sta t e Department publ i s hed i n August 1949 
1§/ 
a one t housand page Whi t e Paper on China. The White Paper 
contained a review of Sino- American r e l ations with d octunents 
and l e tters r elating to the mor e r ecent dealings ith the 
Chinese . 
I n e ffec t t he State Depar tment ihite Pap er rote off the 
Chines e Na t i onali s ts and rejec ted the the or y t hat mor e Americ 
aid woul d have enabled Chiang Kai•shek to have won the civil 
war . 
I n the closing months of 1949 Chia ng Kai-shek was in 
refuge on Formos a , the Communists c ontr olled most of t he China 
mainland and Formosa was threatened with C om~1nis t invasion . 
I ndia and Great Bri t ai n r ecogni zed t he Communis t Govern-
ment i n China and t here was pressur e in the United States t o 
rec ogni ze Communis t Chi na a t thi s time. 
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Republicans in Congress were demanding American armed 
forc es be us ed to d efend Forwosa . The President was forced 
to ma k e a statement on our Formosa-Chi na policy and issued a 
s tatement on January 5, 1950 barring any United Sta tes mili tary 
intervention , aid or advi ce to the Chinese Na tional i sts on 
Formosa. He l imited any ass i stance to economic recovery then 
w in f orce. · · 
The attitude of the United States t oward l'lationalist China 
on Formosa was outlined in a s peech by the Secretary of State 
in J anuary . I n his speech he said American policy was based 
on t he revulsion of the Chinese a gains t their age•old mis e r ies 
and against f oreign domina ti on. He noted tha t the United s·~ate 
had s pecial mi litary respons ibili ties i n the area from the 
Aleuti ans through Jap an to the Phillipines , and said that 
other Asiatic countries, if f aced with a ggression, must f irst 
meet it t hemselves, then call on the United Nations for aid• 
This s t a t ement put Formosa outside t he vital defense line, 
actually it wrote Formosa off as having no s trategi c value. 
The Joint Chief s of Staff concurred with this policy a t the 
time; however, they qualified their viewpoint by say ing that 
Formosa i n the hands of an unfriendly countr y would be cause 
for al arm . 
When on June 27 , 1950, President Tr uman ordered the 
United States military f orces to go into action in Korea, he 
]!)) Appendix I 
also directed the Seventh Fleet to prevent an ttack on the 
i s l and of F1ormosa. Thi~3 i sland sheltered Chinese Nationalist 
leaders and their armed forces . As a f orme.r Chinese posses-
sion, it was coveted by the Chinese Communists ho had, in 
fact, public l y proc laimed their intention of invading and 
capturing it . 
Our action in neutrali zing Formosa. was a matter of 
securi ty . OUr purpose was to prevent a. communist attack on 
the island which would have enlarged the Korean cri s is , the:r•e-
by r endering it more difficult to carry ou t our obligations to 
the Uni ted Nati6ns in Korea . 
Soviet and Chinese Communists charged the United States 
with " aggression" in Formosa and brought the matter before the 
Security Council . The United States welcomed a United Nations 
inves tiga tion and suggested that a United Na tions com..mission 
be sent ·t o Formos a to observe and report facts. 
In the President 's radio talk to the people on ~eptember 
1, 19.50 , he said, "We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia 
for ourselves . ~ e believe the future of Formosa, like that of 
any other territory in dispute , should be settled peacef'ully . 
We believe that it should be settled by international action 
and not by the decision of the United States or any oth r 
state alone, The mission of the Seventh Fbet is to keep 
Formosa out of the conflict. Our purpose is peace , not con .. 
ques t . •• 
Americ ts policy vas predicated on "police ction" or 
l imitod :~a.r under the United Nations aegis nd their policy 
as on of reluctance to defend Formo a; rath r th y chos to 
nut li~e her, awaitin.e otteome of the .oren confltct . 
r.rhe entry of the Chi_neoe Comnm:niata lnto th Kor -n ' r 
in June 24., 1950 chane E>d the ~ ho1 picturo and m d 1 t n c-
e$sar to make new policy decisl.on • The re u1ts brought the 
controver ial decis ion over F'or•mosa to the .front , tho u e of 
Chiang Ka1-shek t s troops and a "limit dtt vers s '1 xp nded" 
war in the Orient. 
In April 19.$1 the Secret ry of Defen e nnounc d t h t the 
Chires Nati onalists on For os ould be given rr:ore arms for 
d fen e n that an American mi litary group 1oul d be ent to 
the i s land, a complete revers 1 of the policy m de in 
Je.nua:ry 19$0. 
The Secretary of Defens told the Senate Committe th t 
the Urited ~tates d d not intend to barter Formos a and eat 
on the United Nations to Communist Chin in return t or a Kore 
ettle .. ent . 
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CHAPTER III 
LIFE AND TI ME TREATMENT 
CHINA POLICY 1945 - 1950 
In presenting Time and Lifers treatment of the Uni ted 
States-China Policy fr om 1945 through 1950, I have summarized 
the years separately with comments that I feel were necessary 
1/ 
for clarification of the issues referred to .-
The problem presented is whether or not after reading 
Life and Time, could the average American reader make up hia 
mind concerning this controversial 1$sue? Is the issue pre-
sented by bias reports to the extent that they are not honest? 
Have the magazines been consistent in their treatme.nt of the 
policy and the issues involved? 
Time and Life. rs emphasis is on background information 
upon which it projects its i nterpretation of current events . 
I t will be obvious to the reader tha t they are not objective 
in their presentation of the China policy, but purely inter-
preti ve , not objective because they freely express opinions, 
i nterpretive in their reflections of the judgment of accepted 
experts •. "Impartial! ty has been found to be the less 
effective technique to use in news reporting except under 
s pecific cond itions. Actually opposing propaganda apparently 
tend to nullify each others effects. · When readers are con-
!7 •Wr1 ter•s comments enc losed i n single quotation marks.• 
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fronted with arguments both for and against an issue the effect y 
is cancel led out. " Life and Time were convinced of' the 
righteousness of their cause; complete support of Chiang Kai-
I . 
s hekts governmen~and containment of Communism in Asi a, and 
freely used all the tools of reporting . Sensationalism, name 
cal ling , glittering generalities are noted throughout the text 
and are so obvious that I have not made any attempt to point 
them out specifically . 
There has been complete consistency throughout the five 
periods in advocating a pro- Chiang Kai - shek and anti - Communist 
policy in opposition to the policy ad vacated by the State De-
partment and subsequently adopted. 
My two years in China during this period cemented my 
II 
I' 
rl 
,, 
I 
opinion on the fallacy of the United States -China policy durin, , 
the last five years and, a l though I have not al ays been in 
1 
accord with Life and Time •s techniqu.es of reporting , I have 
been in complete harmony ~ith their pro-Chiang Kai - shek and 
anti - Communist policy for China. 
194$ 
Three events of international importance infl uencing the 
trend of our poli cy in China occurred in the Y.ear 1945 ; the 
Ya1 ta Conference 3/ , the Sino-Soviet Treaty L.l, the defeat of 
J apan , and Genera!' George C. Marshall' s mission to Ch i na , a s 
President Truman ts special envoy 2/• 
y Klappe , Johri T" .. The Effect of Mass Media - Chapter on 
Partial Impartiality . 
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I 'l woul d single out the Yal te. Agreement as of determining 
importance in this year. The fact that secre t a greement con-
cerning China and Russia was not made public until F'ebruary 
1946 accounted for the minimum accounti ng in the magazi nes. 
The i mportance of the Yalta Agreement in the whole pos t -war 
period cannot be exaggerated . I mention it here because the 
Yalta Conference was held i n February of 1945·• 
When Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley went to China in January 
he was highl y praised and his attempts to bring together the 
Chinese Communists and the Central Govern.7ll ent for the purpose 
of creating a united front a gai ns t the Japanese was s trongl y 
' 
supported. The mission was a failure because the Kuomintang 
leader, Chiang Kai -shek, insisted t ha t the Communist army come 
under the Central Government. A state-within-a-state could 
not be tolerated and neither party dared surrender the po ~er 
which rested in their armed forces. Actually, the a ttempts to 
bring the two parties together represented an approval of a 
coalition. General Hurley later denied favori~such a move-
ment except as the exigency of war demanded it~ General 
Hurley resigned as Ambassador to China charging Chinese 
s ympathizers i n the Stat e Department were undermining Chiang 
Kai.-shek•s government. 
28 
In the mi dst of war with Jap.an, the Kuomintang began to 
f ill the promise to introduce liberal const itutional rule, 
67 Senate Investigation Committee on General MacArthur's 
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i th freedom for the people to organize pol l tica! ,Parties and 
. . ~ 
to participate in the government of the country . 
The Communists refus ed to participa te in a National 
Assembl y s ponsored by t he Kuomintang and set up their own 
8/ 
government in North China .- ~ ith t he Communists planning to 
se t up an independ ent organization in North China, China had 
two open claimants to Chinese sovereignty; ge ographic lly and 
poll tioally China oul d be fatally partitioned . 
The issue before the United States a t thi s time as 
whe ther or not the United St ates s hould openly and forc i bly 
support the Government of Chiang Kai-shek i n its fight against 
the Chinese Communists. If not , ho elsa coul d the traditions. 
f'ree and · uni tad China be mai ntained . I f Chiang Kai - shek coul d 
take Manchuria without United States hel p , Washington ould 
ha ve no problem. But they lacked transportation and the ir 
forces ere virtually immobili zed due to the fact that the 
Communists contJ;"olled the railway and all llnes of communica-
tion to Manchuria. 
Communist control of 'Manchuri a ould oonsti tute a maj or 
s h1.ft in the Far East. General iV'edemeyerts direc tives ere 
such that he could not use United States f orces to h lp t he 
Central Government enter Manchuria in t he fear of Communist 
a t tacks on communication lines. 
1J National Inaugurate Consti t u tional Government t o convene-
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The United States policy in China was not strong enough 
to support Chinese unirication under Chiang ·Kai -shek . The 
State Department insisted United States intervention would not 
solve China's basic problems. 
•Time Magazine and Life place the blame for t he failure 
of our China policy squarely in the State Department, concur-
ring with General Hurley. tater they spared no words blaming 
Secretary of State Byrnes, Marshall and Acheson.• 
21 The Sino-Soviet Treaty concluded before the end of the 
war with Japan, gave China a breathing s pell from civil war, 
but its success depended on how much economic , financial and 
diploma tic aid China would receive from the United States. 
11Chinats treaty with Russia stabilized her internal relations." 
10/ 
- •In evaluating the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Time and Life sup -
ported President Roosevelt's reasoning that hi s only recours e 
was to bui l d a temporary bridge of understanding be tween China 
and Russia i n hope that political or other conflict could be 
postponed during China•s conflict. They retained their con-
sistent anti -Russian Communist policy and not until the secret 
11/ 
agreement made a t Yalta -- disc losing concessions to Russia 
did Time and Life attack both treaty and a greements.• 
In 1945 Life wrote "Present prospects i n China are a 
g/ 
vindica tion of American policy in Asia •11 The words were 
W Appendix D 
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written immediately after the Sino-Soviet Treaty was made 
public. 
l----
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In December, President Truman sent General George c. 
Marshall to China as his Special Envoy presenting a. new policy 
w for ac tion in China. The United States ob j ectives a t thi s 
time were t o end the ei ghteen-year~old civil war in China and 
to s peedily dis arm the Japan$·se and return t hem to Ja pan. The 
policy was de f initely that of not participating in civil war. 
The United States forces were to remain in China to help 
Chiang Kai -shek take over con.trol of North China from the 
Japanese. If China could not achieve internal peace United 
Stat es would not lend assistance or grant loans. •Time 
interpreted t his denial of aid a threat to media t e.• 
It was not easy to steer even the clearest policy through 
the complexity of China's politics. General Marshall, however, 
was eminently qualified for the job; he knew the background of 
General Stilwell's quarrel with Chiang Kai -shek and he was the 
Chief' of Staff who dictated General Wedemeyer's order to sup-
port Chiang Kai-shek's government. General Mars hall beli eved 
that the peace of the world depended in a large measure on 
Chinats s uccess in reaching unity and strength . nAny one who 
knows good soldier Marshall at a~ knows he is first of all a 
lltl 
man of peace." · On General Marshallts shoulders the hopes 
of Eas t Asia rested. 
~ Appendix B · = Life - December 10 
General Marshallts diploma tic mi ssion as to mediate be -
t1een the National ist Government and the Chinese Communists . 
He as instructed to bring a bout a roconci l iation betJeen the 
two parties •. General Wedemeyer was restricted in use of 
A~erican sea and air transport by the State Department, pendin 
the outcome of General Mars hall•s discussion wit. the Chinese 
leaders in Chungking, s eat of Na tionalist Government. 
tThroughout the year , Time and Li.fe ere optimis tic in 
their belief that United States policy uould be to support 
Chiang Kai - shek's government " They favored Marshall's mission 
to a ffect a coalition between the Nationalists and· t he Com-
muni s ts . "If we help Chiang over the crest and if Russia can 
be assured 1e seek no soecial advan~~&e inside China, the Com-
- !21 
munists can be dealt with simply ." · They stressed the need 
for military and economic ass istance to Chiang Kai-shek and 
tarned of Russia ts interference in the internal affairs of 
China , despite the Sino-Soviet Treaty . 
!£/• 
tJohn K. Fairbanks presented a very different vi ewpoint 
when he claimed that the Russian interventionist activity in 
Ch i na since V•J Day had been no greater than the aid of the 
w United States .• 
15J Life -December 17, 1945 
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The three outatanding events of international i m orta nce 
re£lec ting our China poli cy as reported by Life a nd Time were: 
General Geor ge C. Marshall' s mis sion to China, and its subse -
quent failure , and the disclosure or the secret agreement made 
between President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin at Yalta • .!§./ 
To unders t and the significance of the sequences of events 
t hat created the d i fficul ties confronting General Marshall , I 
wi ll briefly outline them. 
For the purpose of effecting a peaceful unifica tion , the 
1 National Government called the People•s Consultative Council, 
in January, composed of representatives of all political 
11 parties . Agreements ere made for reachi ng a truce between 
the Government a nd the Communists, and for i ntegration of 
armed forces, including the Communists army , into one na tional 
ar my . These agreements wou l d have brought about a solu tion of 
China •s political problem. 
lhen truce \Tas declared i n January , Communists infiltrated II 
into Man churia for the purpose of occupying important citi es II 
being evacuated by the Russians 1 whi ch according to Sino- Soviet 
19/ I 
11 Trea t y of August 1945 - should be occupied only by Chinese 
Government troops. 
When the time a rri ved to hold the Na tional Assembly in 
!.1ay the Communis t s refused to 4Emd the names of delega tes; 
they were reluctant to name representatives to participate in 
t he proposed coalition government. 
W Appendix C 
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•The failure of General Marshall to achieve a coalition 
gover•nment proved that the citril war going on at that time wa s 
not a struggle between t o poll tical parties fo r power· . 
The Chinese Communists was not a movement, but a local 
self-government , not a movement for peaceful agrarian r·eforms; 
their method for liquida ting of land lords included small land -
hOlders, always confiscated by force. 
It waw the challenge of a minority party with an inde-
pendent army agains t the authority of the established govern-
ment i n the hope of ge tting control of the country.• 
General Marshall's mediation persuaded the leaders of the 
warring factions to sign a nilitary truce in January. The big 
problem all during the consultations between General Marshall 
1 and leaders of the Nationalists and Conununista was how much 
II 
I ~ 
II 
power the Kuo~intang s houl d have in a coalition government and 
how a single unified a r·my could be for med . arshall tried to 
mediate as though between minority and majority leaders. The 
agains t the government. 
I n Ma:rch when General Mars hall reported back to ~ashing­
ton of his success in bringing a bout a military truce, Time 
reported ttfor the first time in maj or post-war issue, powe:r, 
34 
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brought to bear in a constructi ve fashion . If the United 
failed to move affi r ma tivel-y and effectivel y in Chi na tho 
I 
world could only have come to the dis illusioning conclusion I/ 
~ that United States d emocracy ~as not an exportabl e commodity . " II 
:I pr iority for China . She needed food, r aw cotton, cred it , 
1arshall after three _ontP~ in China pleaded for s pec ial 
l arge sh re of surplus property a nd loan from the U. S . Export - ! 
I mport Bank . 
Vlhen iarshall arrived back in Chi na in J_ay h e a s f aced 
with as difficul t a task as he had in J m1uary . The. Communists 
wanted a one-to- five ratio on troops, claiming the situation 
had cha ng ed and refused to participate in a coalition govern-
ment and the fi&htlng was resumed . Negotiati ons, h o ever, 
continued . 
In reporting the approaching economic disas ter in June 
the causes were p laced in the following order: I 
1 . Communi s t re' elli on. 1' 
2. Failure of United States to send e nough ai d . I 
3 . Corruption and ineffici ncy of Na tional Government!!• 
The policy advocated to correct t he corruption and ineff1c1enc~ 
was f .or the United States to g et into Kuomintang politics deeP, 
enough to set the KUomintang house in order . I nside the 
Kuomintang there was a liberal element, men without po¥er ho 
I were starting to d ema nd cha nges . Men like Sun Fo , Ma Yen- Chu, 
20/ 'rime - March 25, 1946 , p . 2 8 
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j1 and Mayor Wu of Shanghai • 
I~ 
"What else can the Americans do but 
continue to support the Central Government in vi ew of the 
2 
ideological tie betwe en China's Communists and Sovie t Russia." 
Marshall arranged another cease-fire i n August and t he 
Communists offered to relax their stranglehold on communication 
lines f or concessions. Chiang refused the concessions and 
tried t o pry the Communists off of China•s life line. Chiang 
knew a divided China could not survive if he decided on an 
all-out war . Finally, late i n August, General Marshall and 
President Truman admi tted their e.fforts to bring peace to 
Chi na all but failed. "United States faced a major se t up i n 
w its policy of pacifying China. tt 
The problem the Uni ted States faced was shoul d Unite'd 
States throw full support behind Chiang or permit Chi na to 
become a Soviet satellite. 
I n November, the laat hope of successful United States 
mediat ion vanished but Chiang was also proving that Ch i na 
could be united by military means. 
The National Constituti onal Assembly in face of C om~unist 
boycott convened, making hopes for mediation di m. There was 
no longer room for talks of mediation between a s overeign 
government ~nd armed rebels. "President Truman •s directive of 
23/ 
December- had been ou tdated by events. Chiang Kai - shek•s 
21/ Time - June 10, 1946 
1 ~/ Time • August 19, 1946 
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success in the field had invalidated it." 
I In December President Truman issued a new statement on 1 
II United States policy in China, nothing new or suri'aae, mere1y :J 
'I illV II 
i' 
restated the lines he laid down when Marshall went to China• 
1: General Marshall now . had nothing left to mediate with after II 
1! President Truman issued his new statement. l1 
t: 
•I 
In a text kept secret until February, six months a~ter 
the time when military necessity might have excused the hush-
I 
hush policy while it had mi litary consideration (Russia joining ! 
w I 
in Japanese war), the agreement made at Yalta was as poll t- II 
!cal as a pork barrel. The Yalta deal was the basis of last .
1 w year•s Sino-Russia pact. · Expediency was not enough to cover 1 
the loss of United States moral posl tion from secret diplo- I! 
w macy. · · 
II 
tIn this treatment by Time Magazine of the Yalta Agreement I, 
I d~.sagree and heartily a gree wl th Sumner Wells that there was IJ 
no alternat~ve to the policy decided upon by President Roose-
velt which in 1945 would have seemed to promise so much hope 
for success in the construction of a peaceful Asia. If Stalin 
had respected the treaty ith the Chinese Nationalist Govern-
ment which he signed at Moscow in June 1945, that theaty would 
have paved the way for the unification of China and for the 
11 eventual creation of a strong postwar China.' w 
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I n this year the emphasis on the news on China and ou~ 
policy covered the failure of the Marshall Mission, General 
Wedemeyerts Fac t Finding Miss ,.on, the Bullitt Report and 
insistent demands for aid to Chiang Bd-shek•s gove~nment. 
•The controversial issue of giving all-out aid to Chiang 
Kai-shekts government o~ non-interference in the internal 
stri.fe (civil wa~), the policy advocated by Gene~al Marshall 
and supported by the Administration b~ought out two conflicting 
viewpoints .from which there as no easy compromise.• 
Marshall 's mission was a .failure .for many reasons but 
mainly because he tried to achieve quickly wha.t Chinese histor) 
had not accomplished in centuries - unity and democracy both 
at the same time. The only way to have achieved a united and 
1 democratic China was by giving all-out support to the govern-
ment of Chiang Kai-shek; instead, General Marshall, by 
treating the Communist guerrillas as equals to Nationalists 
and urging coalition, was presenting a United States policy 
that could be called intervention and stupidity. The Govern-
ment and the Communists refused to make concessions suf.ficient 
.for a compromise that would unite the nation and permit growth 
. w 
of democratic institutions. Marshall i n his statement 
blamed ~adicals among the Comm'lnists and reactionaries among 
government leaders. China shaken by economic c~isis was left 
to civil ,war when Marshall left, giving no hint o.f the policy 
29/ Appendix E 
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the United States would adopt. The issue over the policy to 
be taken 
1. United States complete withdra al, or 
2. Continued aid to Chiang on condition he 
instituted reforms. 
The questions of adopting either policy brought up the problem 
, of h ow a line could be drawn between China •s economy and 
helping Chiang Kai -shek wa ge a full-scale anti-Co~~unist war . 
, Secondly, would the United States public stand for lending 
material and presti ge to support a r egi me so reluctant to clean 
u p its own house? However, some positive policy ould have 
to be made. 
The onl y hope in China to attain a democratic government 
would b e the rise of the liberals from Kuomintang and minority 
, parties . For t he last year Chiang Kai -shek had been intro-
ducing reforms, but there was s till bureaucracy in the 
Kuomintang . Chiang Kai-shekts government tried to do what 
General Marshall wanted but Washington continued to judge 
China by standards of political morality higher t han t hose 
appl ied to Greece, Turkey or Russia to whom United States had 
given billions without inquiring whe t her their officials were 
competent and politically pure . General Marshall's outdated 
t hinking guided the thinking of many American liberals during 
t he year 1947. 
T 
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1I believe that every effort should have been made by 
General Marshall to bring about a peaceful adjustment between 
Chiang Kai~shek •s government and the Chinese Communists, just 
as during the war we tried to prevent the two fac t ions from 
(I 
~ 
]I 
II 
lj 
fi ghting each other rather than the Japanese. I do not believe ! 
I 
we should have permitted General Marshall to have threatened 
I 
Chiang Kai-shek into bringing representatives of the Chinese 
Communist Party into the Chinese Cabinet~ Marshall threatened 
Chiang Kai-shek with withdrawal of all American aesistance un-· 
less he "broadened" his government by appointing Communists as 
well as other nliberal't elements to the Cabinet. Life and Time I 
1' fav.ored General Marshall •s attempts to form a coalition govern- ~ 
11 
1
1 ment and not until the misslon failed did they vehemently 1 
1
1 attack General Marshall ts endeavors in China and Mr. Truman •s II 
"outdated" China policy . ·Time ts reaction to a coalition 
government was that it would bridge the gap between the 
J2l Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists . However, 
they qualified the failure of the mission due to United States 
insistence on reforms which they did not demand in Greece, 
Turkey or Russia before giving aid., 
In July Secretary of State Marshall dispatched General 
II 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
Wedemeyer to China to make an appraisal of the over-all situ-
ation. The problem of United States relations with China had I 
1 been drifting for months . General Wedemeyer •s job was · to find I 
r 30/ Time - September 2, 1946. lj --===~11 -=============~~~~--------
how Ch ina could be held . Unlike General Marshall, he always 
opposed attempts to bring Communis ts into a coalition govern-
ment. Wedemeyer's task 1as actually to estimate the bare mini-
mum required to keep China ali ve. The United States was not 
abandoni ng China , merely relegating her to a holding action as 
in World War II. General Wedemeyer had g one to see what he 
could do to retrieve losses t hat f ollowed five -star General 
I Marshall •a indecisi ve indecision and policy of splendid 
li 
II 
I' 
II 
I 
isolation from civil war. 
· General Wedemeyer came back from China i n October after 
talking only to government critics; the government leaders had 
no chance to air their views • . 
The Wedemeyer :report was kept a top secret. He was sent 
to Chi na to help United States make a choice between aid to 
China, or the abandonment of 400 million people t hreatened by 
the Communists. General Wedemeyer :reported that military 
force al one cou l d not eliminate the Communist. This was con-
trary to Chiang Kai -shek 's bel i ef tha t only by defeatinr; the 
Communists and endi ng t he civil war co~ld China become 
economically stablized and politically sound end democratic. • 
General Wedemeyer recommended financial and military aid 
to China within sixty days, otherwise Manchuria would be lost 
to Russia; also long term grants to bolster their economy . 
China•s economy was disintegrating s o fast the United States I 
I would have t o aband on a poll tical beachhead in Asia • The IJ 
.,1- 1'~~=~ 
'I I 
I 
I 
Wedemeyer report was not published ~ "Marshall did not a gree 
He feared t o fan 
II 
I 
I 
II 
i/ 
il Publication of t he 
1 11 rep ort would jeopardize Congressional approval of European aid 
with the recommendations fully subscribed . 
the fire of United States-Soviet conflict~ 
which,in Marshall's diplomatic strategy,had priority. 
w 
I n shor~, 
II Asia must ait . •• 
\Vhen General Wedemeyer was summoned before t he Senate 
1 Appropriation Committee l n a last minute attempt to unravel 
t he aid to China bill, he urged all-out aid to China now, in 
arms and dollars. This testimony was his personal opi nion . 
He made his case on a straight an ti -C ommunist line and con-
vinced the members of t he Committee. At this time American 
forces were preparing t o pull out of China . 
I 
I 
:r 
II 
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When the State Department pi geonholed t he Wedemeye r Report: 
Life d ispatched William c. Bullitt, f ormer Ambassador to China,j 
to bring back the true situation in China . I n his report to I 
Bl I t he American People on China he stated emphaticall y 
1. Without United States help China is doomed to 
become a satellite of Russia . 
2. China can b e saved f or 1/20 t he coat of keeping· 
Western Europe, under t he Marshall Plan . 
3 . ~ e must ac t at once . · 
-4. I t is i n our own self-de.fense we must act to pre-
r 
,I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
vent Sovie t domi na t ion of China . . I 
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: •I t is interesting to note here that men like John K. 
w 
Fairbanks were saying that an American policy of military 1 
I A 
'/ aid to help an unpopular government suppress a s ocial revolutiof 
I 
would play into the Communis t hands; t hat Chiang Kai - shek as a I 
'*running dog of American i mperialism0 as a traitor who sold 
his c ountry to forei gners in order to stay in power.• 
1948 
Aid to China, the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist 
Governn1ent on the mainland and the failure of United Stat es 
policy in China was covered fully in the year 1948 . 
The fe.ilu:re of Chiang Ka1 - shek's government ~ent back to 
,I the Cairo Conference in 1943 , 
11! Minister Churchill promised Chiang Kai-shek to crush Jnpan and 
President Roosevelt and Prime 
restore all territory lost in half c~ntury of struggle with i 
I the Japanese. 
The spearhead of Chiang Kai -shek•s reconstructi on as 
Manchuria vlith its coal, iron and factories, At the las t 
moment it ras snatched from China 's hands. 
Part of the price United Sta tes paid to Stalin a t Yal t a 
was to promise that the United States would support Russia's 
. . . lV 
bid for a "special posi tion in Manchuria'f. 
Vlhen Russia marched into Manchur i a three d ays after the 
a tomic b omb exploded they d isarmed the Japanese there and 
handed over their arms to the Chinese Communists . When Russia 
ill Fairbanks, John K., Next Step in Asia, P • 1.5. J!IJ Appendix C 
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opened the door of Manchuria to Communists after v-J Day , 
they had a renewable arsenal . 
The United Sta t es sent a succes sion of s pec ial e nvoys, 
including General Ge orge C. Marshall , to mediate be tween 
Chiang Kai - s hek and Mao Tse - tung . Mediation merely succeeded · 
i n hol ding Chiang 's forces for nine months in 1945-46 whi le 
the Chinese Communists dug in . 
When the Communists seized Changchun , Harbin, Tsisihai, 
Chiang ordered an all- out offensive . He felt mi litary action , 
was the only way to keep China united , not by admi t ting Com-
munists into t he government while allowing t hem to keep Red 
commanded army divisions; Chiang knsw t here was no pos ition 
of neu trality one coul d take wi t h the Communists . Chiang 
·Kai -shek had counted on sustained United States aid and he 
did not get 1 t . 
The Chinese respec ted Chiang ts will and his na tional 
1pride but they fel t he had f ailed them. The Generals leading 
I 
his forc es were too old; there was hoarding and corruption 
:;due to the de s perate ec onomic collapse and a movement had 
started among the intellectuals for peace at any price . 
Secre t ary of State Marshall ts attitud~ on China was colored 
by hi s failure in China and he clung to the beli ef tha t China 
could no rate no more t han t he attention of a hold i ng ac ti on . , 
He offi cially reversed hi s recommendations (made when he was 
44 
special e nvoy to China) that the Nationalists and the Com-
munists should get together in a coalition government. The 
United States authorized military aid ror fighting the Com-
munists (but it was erfective not soon enough and not 
enough ). China•s policy was ri ght where it was in 1947, 
J:2/ 
'•covering face and losing race". 
It was unrealistic to think United States could pull 
China out of her economic hole with a one-year program . 
1 months earlier United States declared its intention of 
giving Chiang Kai -shek mi litary aid and Congress forced a 
reluctant State Department to include China in an E. c. A. 
program. 
The delay in appropriations was a psychological retreat I 
rrom China. Secretary Marshall had never reconciled himselr ' 
I 
to doing business with the Chinese Government which he con- I 
sidered corrupt. He felt Europe should receive top priority ' 
and the Far East situation was secondary. When Chiang ts 
military situation worsened Washington gave no sign it would I 
send China additional aid. 
While United States talked about reforms the Communists I 
were winning the war. We were fighting Communism in Europe 
and leaving the Asiatic back door open. Our policy became a I 
defeatist policy. 
12/ Time - September 30, 1948 
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We won World War II but lost the peace , was revealed 
J.Y in Wi lliam C. Bullitt 's second article in Life. 
1. The sad inside hi story of Teheran, Yalta and 
Potsdam , when two American Presidents gave away the 
fruits of victory for Stalin's empty promise. 
2. How a sick Roosevelt appeas.ed Stalin and broke 
pledges at Yalta. w 
3• How Marshall unwittingl y helped the Chinese 
Communists overrun Manchuria. 
4. Why it took President Truman two years to learn 
that our foreign policy was bankrupt• 
5. Why the war is coming toward the Americans and 
what the President must do . 
6. We face a struggle for survival. 
I' 
•I t would be interesting to know how many of those chief-
' ly responsible for our Far Eastern poli cy since 1945 are 
familiar wi th t he writing of Lenin or with the cardinal 
doctrines that he and Stalin laid down with regard t o the Far ' 
East. These show t hat one of the basic tenets of Soviet Com-
' 
,munism has always been that once the billion and a hal f men 
and women in China, India and Southeast Asia have been in ... 
doc trinated to Communism, and were linked to the people of 
~ tire - September 6, 1948 J1l Appendix C 
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Russia in the struggle to bring about the orld triumph of 
Communist ideology , the immense superiority in manpower of 
that alliance would insure the defeat of Western capitalism . 
' American policy in t he Far Eas t bet een 1945 and 1950 has 
expedited rather than retarded the achievements of that end . 1 
Sumner Wells reports an appeal Dr . Hu Shih , Chinese 
Ambassador in Washington, made to this government in December 
1948 which expresses my sentiments completely.• 
ncommunism is so implacable and intolerant, so diabol -
ically t horough in its indoctrination , and s o ruthless i n 
enforcing its totalitarian control even i n China that Chiang 
Kai-shek should be supported despite his shortcomings, be -
cau se he alone sees this and has -been uncompromising i n re-
. w 
slating it.n 
This a ppeal was disregarded and ~· e not only failed to 
gain that friendship of the Chinese pe ople which the Admin-
istration and its " liberal" supporters believed could be 
1 gai ned by withdrawing American support from Chiang , but we 
face a traditionally friend ly people poisoned by vicious 
and effective Communist ~ropaganda ith a fanatical hatred 
for t he American people. 
1949 
The Red triumph in As ia, the Whi te Paper on China and 
the debate over aid for fighting Communism in Asia was cove~ 
l§J Wel~s.! -~~ner, Seven Decisions That Shaped His tory , p .219 
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,, 
47 
in the year 1949. 
Red t riumph in China closed a n event.ful phase i n C hina • t:~ 
rise from mediaevalism. For political pur poses Chiang Kai-
s hek •s e ra was over, the era of the Kuomintang which began 
with Sun Yat- sen thirty-seven years a go. History may ye t 
conc l ude that the end of that era wi ll rank with the great 
tragedies of history. 
Ameri cans s hould never forget t .hat a Communis t victory 
in China i s a victory for the Soviet Union and a major 
disaster for the United States . General Douglas MacAr thur 
had told the United States Chiefs of Staff that a Communist 
China constituted a direct threat to the military security 
Xll 
of the United States. 
United States a t the close of 1948 had no policy , no 
p osition iorth mentioning in China and very little in Asia 
either. Recent American records i n Europe where a positive 
policy , posi tively supported , shows _wha t the United States 
can do when it has t he will to act. Asia is lost only if 
1 America choses to lose it . 
Mao Tse-tung shattered an illusion long cherished by 
many Americans t hat Chinese Communists were "differe nt" . 
Mao Tse-tung declared that the Chinese Communists belonged 
' to the anti-imperialis t .front headed by the U.s .s.R. and 
I' 
I. 
I 
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claimed neutrality was a camouflage . 
Chiang Kai - shek asked for an international mediation on 
the civi l war and there were rumors that United States and 
Russia would be called on for joint mediation . The Commun-
ists rejected any international mediation, peace would be 
declared only on their terms, which were uncond itional sur-
render. Vfuen the Nationalists signed the truce, 460 million 
people passed under Communist domination and Chiang Kai - sh ek 
stepped out . 
Mao Tse-tung ts victory made a ma jor change on the 
political and strategic world picture on t he western s hores 
of the Pacific. 
The United States policy had been that aid to China 
was first unnecessary, secondly undesirable and then too 
late. They reasoned that the defeat of the Nationalists 
was due to the corruption of Chiang Kai - shek 's government, 
and the United States military supplies falling to the Com-
munists withou t a fight. 
In July, twenty- one senators signed a statement de-
manding an assurance tha t the United States woul d not 
recognize Communist China. The State Department wanted to 
recognize the Chinese Communists in concert with the British 
who hoped by establishing normal relations with Red China 
~·· · 
I 
l 
I' 
I 
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they could safeguard Hongkong. The State Department made the 
following case for recogniti on: 
1. Chinese Communists are entering a long period of 
stress, They must cope with vast economical and 
tecbn0logical problems with provincial and local 
dissidents. 
2 . If United States recognizes Red China it can main-
tain consular posts to observe difficulties and 
encourage opposition. 
3 . The presence of United States diploma ts ~ould tend 
to inhibit Russia's move to strengthen her grip on 
China. 
J• 
I· 
I So far , the Reds have shown themselves utterly inhibited 
by the presence of United States Diplomats. Any recognition 
of Communist China would signify the approval of a regime 
that is an enemy of the United States and for what the 
United States stands for in Asia , and ould be a surrender 
to an approval of any enemy of the United States . 
China ' s calamity was proclaimed in the 1,054-pa ge State I' 
w Department vVhi te Paper. The United States Government was 11 
perilously close to adding good riddance to China . Secretar~ 
I 
of State Acheson operated on the prostrate body of Nationalist 
China. It was a savage indictment of China's Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai -shek. 
[Q! _Z(_ppendlx F --=---==--=----=-- == == I _.Jt-
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The State Department ' s b razen assertion of its own 
u t ter gui ltlesmess made no sense, notabl y in view of the 
. 
fac·t that it sank t wo bi llion i n a si t uat ion it had long 
regarded h opeless . 
Sena t or Vandenberg called the paper a " t r agic mis take" 
·I 
r 
and claimed the State Departmentis i mprac t ical ins is t ence on , 
1!!1 
c oalition with t he CommunEts and the Yal t a Agreement 
negotiat ed behind Chi na• s back opened t he gates of Manchuria 
t o t he Sovie t armi es. 
Irascible old General Stilwell i n his s neering reports 
I 
to Washi ngton over Chiang Ka i - shek •s reluc t ance to swallow ,1 
t he b i t ter pill of recognizing the Communists played a part 
in forming State Department •s a t ti tudes a bou t Chian g Kai - s hek '. 
The United States ignor ed Gen eral Wedemeyer's recommen -
da t ions; it suppressed the release of his report unti l 
!@ 
Augus t 1949· The Stat e Department filed a pe ti t i on i n 
I bankr uptcy a nd was d esperately seeking solven cy i n plati tude~ 1 
and rec r imi nations . At t he moment , t here was no chanc e of a 
pos iti ve program i n China. 
Republicans were cr itical of' t he China policy and were 
demand i ng American armed forces be used t o d e f end Formosa . 
Li fe and Time subscribed vehement l y to s uch a proposal and 
Ap~endlx C 
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pressed for immediate United Sta tes decisions for the com-
mitment of United States troops to back up the Nationalists 
on Formos a - The State Department , refus ed to consider the 
possibility of Uni t ed States military ai d to Formos a . 
The Stat e Depar tment broke ranks on the China policy . 
Direc tor George Kennan, t he State Department policy planner, 
demanded some attempts be made t o regain t he initiative for 
the United States after the catastrophic failure in the 
Orient . The State Department opposed the ~100 million 
for mili tary aid program in the Far Eastern Section for use 
a gai nst Communists in East Asia . Secretary of State Acheson 1 
thought the amendment would earmar k aid to Nationalists and I, 
ga ve no weight to idea of harassing Communists . He finally I 
yielded reluctant l y but it was too late and the Hous e did 
not pass the bill . 
A ne11 pol icy was ri tten up by Ambassad or- at - large 
I Phillip Jessup who wrote a policy which sounded h ighly 
dange rous t o t he United States pos ition i n t he orl d . 
The basic and highl y dubious premise behind t he tenta-
tive program was t ha t Red China will not s e riously t hreaten 
the United States i nterest during t his generation . Meantime,! 
it is neces s ary to weave an anti - Communist belt around China .li 
The belt did n ot include F'ormosa where the Chinese Na t ional -
ists were preparing a last stand . 
I, 
I. 
The State Department wrote off the island because of 
its inefficient and locally unpopular administra ti on. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff decided F'ormosa had no strategic 
i mpor t ance to United States security, although the l sland 
in Red hands ould break the United States security line. 
The Republicans i n Congress were publicly r ecommend i ng 
e. proposal: 
1 . Turn over to committee 75 million appro-
priation to oppose Communism s pread in China . 
2. Lend strong support to Free China movement . 
3 . Ne ver recogni ze Communis t government of Mao . 
4. Fix attention on F:onnosa and send United 
States troops to occupy the island . 
•Here I feel I shou ld mention the t~o alternative 
policies that were being advocated by pe ople i~ the State 
Depart ment and experts on Chinese affairsa 
a . A policy ·co preser ve China •s independe~ce 
of the Sovie t Uni on e ven at the distas'l:;efu l 
price of accepting a g overnment of inde-
pendent Chinese Communists. 
b . A policy to encourage t he surviva l of 
strong but unorgani zed middle group in 
China - not necessari l y connected with the 
National ist g overnment - which might still 
-- - - ----- -~.=---..:: --=-- --
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be able to limit the power of the Communists 
and keep China on a road at least parallel to 
democracy in its internal life and its re-
43/ 
lations with the outside orld .--
These advocates ruled out assistance to the I~ationalist 
Govei'nment to reconquer China b ecause the National Government 
on Formosa could not hope to recapture China,and t he large 
commitment of United States resources in the For mosa ad-
' venture would be wasteful and it would be of positive 
assistance to the Soviet Union because it would inevitably 
mean that the Chinese Communists would i nvite the Soviet 
Union to participate in the c onflic,t . 
These advocates felt that we must not close the trap 
on the Chinese Communists so that they feel they have no 
alternative but Russia, even if it means temporizing with 
Titoism. Remember these people were suggesting th:ls measure 
in 1949 and early 1950 .• 
19.50 
I 1950 was a critical year. The decision over recogniti on 
of Red China was no doubt the biggest decision confront ing 
the United States. The entrance of th6 Chinese Communists 
into the Korean War and the United States policy in Formosa 
filled the magazine colllm.ns and editorial pages . 
The arguments for recognition and a gainst recognition 
of Communist China by the United States and· for her admit -
Yl/ La~tl~3!e~--Ow~n~ - Ordeal _ ~l Slander , P • 85 . 
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tan.ce to the United Natione Security Council were: w 
Arguments for Recogniti~ 
1 . Red China. illing ally of Stalin , mothing t o 
gain staying alone after Britain and other 
non-Communist · countries recognize her . 
2 . Why s h ould the Uni tesd States s l am t he door :1hen 
a diplomatic p os t could provide an observation 
pos t ? Business men might pr ofit from trade and 
the United States could have h os tages agai ns t 
their safety i n Chinese dependents here . 
3 . Chinese b asically anti - fore ign . Will gro'l to 
hate l osco ·; string-pulling .. Chinese liao may 
become Tito . American Ambassador might encourage 
Mao . 
4. As sole provide r for Japan defi cit the United 
States . tax payers wou l d benefit f i nancially 
if Japan could resume her oldtime brisk trade 
with Chinese mai nland . 
5. Communi s t Chinese will inevitably appl y for 
China•s seat on United Nations Security Counc il . 
What would United States do? Use veto, \1hich it 
scorns i n Russian hands to keep representa tive 
of 450 mi llion from t he only f orum of' inter-
nat i onal discussion? 
' Arguments against Recogni tion 
1 . I t is not true. the United States always plays 
along with "de facton when i t does not approve . 
United States sent no ambassador to Franco•s Spain . 
2 . Br itain owns Hongkong and a billion dollar in-
vestment i n Ch ina·. No reason why United States 
should recognize Communis t Chinese because 
Bri tain doe s . 
) . Ho i can diploma ts, missionaries or businessmen 
have security in Communis t China ? 
4. Ma o •s vi si t to Mosco s h ows n~ sign of moving 
1Jli1 Time - January 2 1950, p . 12 . ~ -= =- ~- -= -:.:=..-.:..=--==---===-----==-~ -- ----
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from i nternat i onal Communist l ine . 
5, To recog nize Mao wou l d be to a bandon friends in 
China, not only the Nationalist Government but 
all anti - Communis t elements . 
6 . Recognition would jeopardize any Unitec States 
moves in Formosa . 
The essence and purpose of Secretary of Sta te Acheson•s 
policy toward the Coir..mu nist government in China since the 
fall of 19q.9 has been to recognize nthe situation as it 
exis ts" and among other . things, adm1 tting the Peiping regime I 
to the United Nations when and if thi s step becomes poli t -
I 
· ically posslb~e . The prevalent a ttitude in the St a te Depart~ 
il 
ment was to encourage Chinese na t ionalism e ven t hough it ~as 
Communis t nationalism. In December, in face or the Chinese 
Communist forces fi ghting in Korea , the United States op-
posed Great Bri t ain's proposal for admi t ting Red China to 
the United Nati ons,reversing their earli er pol icy toward 
45/ 
Communist China .--
Las t year when the Chinese Communist ... conquer ed all of 
t he mainland of China , the Joint Chi efs of Staff decided the ! 
United States should not he l p the Na t ionali s ts t o hold For- , 
mosa ; later , persuaded by General MacArthur, they r eversed 
themselves and decided the United States should at l ,as t 
send a military mission, but Secretary of State Acheson 
objected . 
_ _m Time - December 11, 1950, p . }~-- __ 
Responsible people in Washington agree on the f ollowing: 
1. United States could hol d Formosa. 
2. Nationalists cannot hold Formosa without 
United States Help . 
3· Fall of Formosa 111 make conquests of 
Phillipines and Indo China simple step . 
4· A Communist Formosa ill call .for 20 - 40% 
increase of United States strength in the 
Pacific. Initial cost more than cost of 
hol ding Formosa . 
Secretary Acheson refused to face the danger of the 
Communists' advance in China. He offered the military chiefs 
a phony choice of all~out commitments of United States 
strengt h to anti -Communists forces in Asia or no effective 
resistance at all. The mi l itary men , hamstrung by economic 1 
cuts , backed out. Discouraged, they made no plans for 
fighting Communism in Asia. 
Mr . Acheson had a counter-proposal to o.ffer which care-
1 fully omitted Formosa and non-recognition of Communist Ch ina ,1 
until they proved themselves acceptable. At least it put 
State Department on record with a program for Asia. There 
woul d be no military mission to Formosa. 
Acheson ' s policy overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
who did not protest very vigorously. The Joint Chiefs of 
57 
Staff were supposed to be guardians of military strategy 
and assessors of risks. 
Formosa as abandoned and with it t he one chance for 
the United States to show decisively that 1 t meant to be jl 
1 resolute in containing Communism in Asia, but for better or 
worse we d i d have the beginning of a forei gn policy in Asia 
which was some progress. 
. !±§.! 
President Truman•s statement on our Formosa policy 
and Secretary of State Acheson •s remarks that further aid to ,1 
Formosa exists, and to he+p Chiang Kai-shek ould jeopardize 
the United States stake in Asia caused a great deal of 
criticism from men like Hoover , Taft, Wherry and Knowland . 
Formosa should be weighed in terms of future peril to the 
free world rather than terms of past and United States and 
China mistakes . 
When Secretary of State Dean Acheson had persuaded the 
United St ates Joint Chiefs of Staff , against the advice of 
General MacArthur, that the United States should not inter-
vene in Formosa, he advanced the remarkable argument that 
if Russia had its way in Asia, the Communists would e ventuaDW 
become unpopular among the Asiatic people and t he United 
States would gain popularity for its nice mannered non-inter-
venti on. The Red invasion of South Korea knocked this 1· 
argument into a cocked hat. ill 
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In July President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to 
defend Formosa .. The President asked Chiang Kal-shek •s 
I 
forces to cease bombardment of the Communist - held mainland . I 
The United States polic y now was to keep Formosa out of 
Communist hands . General MacArthur promis ed defense aid 
1 and a mi l itary mission . The United States Government , though 
it pledged t o defend Formosa , still was unwilling to work 
out anything like partnership with the Nationalist Govern• 
I 
t. 
ment on Formosa . To neutrali ze Formosa and avoid a war i 
with Communist China was a t ouchy subject. It made no sense ' 
f or the United States to reverse its concepts of Formosa•s 
I 
strategi c i mportance a nd at the same time to cling stubbornlY, 
to the old don- the-nose political attitude toward For-
mosa t s national government . Prevailing American attitude 
is that any he l p to Formosa, military or economic (beyond 
the pres ent E. c. A. program) woul d be a mistake because it 
oul d bui l d up the National Government again, identify the 
United States Government with it a nd con tribute to the 
Nationalists return to the mainland so ardently opposed by 
the State Department . 
. ~/ 
The Soviet - Sino a greement in February stipul ated 
that the Soviet Union, over a five-~ear period , woul d pro-
vide China with goods 1orth $300 ,000 , 000 or .60 , 000 , 000 a 
[§}' Appendix J 
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year . This is_ insignificant compared to the val ue of the 
booty the Soviet Union had taken from the Northern area, 
par ticul arl y -Manchuria, which the Soviet Union has looted of 
its industrial e quipment and of the value of Manchuria 's raw 
materi al now subject to Soviet control . !til 
The United States will be in a position to expec t and 
require an attitude of thorough friend liness f rom Na tional ist 
China only when President Truman compels his State Departmen~ 
to abandon e qually debilitating and equally malicious atti-
tude of calculated hos t ility toward the Nationalist Govern-
ment . 
The State Department in September a ttempted to get the 
United Nat ions to adopt the neutrali zing of Formosa. \Vhen 
the Ch:1.nese Reds protested naggression" of United States 
SeventhFl eet , President Truman promised removal at the e nd 
of the Korean War. He said, "The terri tor y in dis pute and 
its future shoul d be settled by international action and 
Korean peace." 
Secretary of State Acheson ts decision to raise the 
future s t atus of Formos a for United Nations discuss ion and 
decision obvious l y chall enged the Nationalists• present 
right to be on Formos a and to oppose the mainland Communists 
from Formosa. 
Y2f DUlles, John Fos t er , War or Peace ? P • 224 
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The United States suggested the Yalta Agreement 221 
giving the IUri l u and Southern Sakhalin Islands to Russ i a 
(which now occupies them) be suppl anted by a four - po er 
agreement disposing of the territories . If t he United States,. 
Britain, Russia and China could not agree within a year -
the United States assumed t hey would not - t he United 
Nations General Assembl y would make decision . 
Similarly , if these four nations could not agree on 
what to d o with Formosa and Formosa's best - knO\vn inhe.bl tant, 
Chiang Kai - shek , that it wou l d be put up to t he veto- free 
General Assembly . 
When Great Britain des ired to give Formosa to t he Com-
munists in a peace settlement , United States would not be 
blackmailed by Mao into a temporary peace . 
I n October , Owen Lattimore reversed his s t and and said 
he would not admit Red China to the United Na tions . He 
turned his back on the State Department and President 
w Truman's China pol icy. 
The whole series of s pecific mistakes i n the United 
States policy toward China has c ontinued to flo from one 
big original mistake . Since they ill continue to breed 
fresh blunders in Asia, it is importan t that ever-y Amer ican 
set up a check list of main errors i n his o~n mi nd . To 
SO/ Appendix C 
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help clarification Life offered her own list of errors 
heDewlth : 
1. Widespread attempt, lasting from 1944 to 19i~7 of 
United States F~r Eastern Policy advisers to arm 
Chinese Communists and to get them admitted to th 
government of China . Propaganda put forward by 
influential policy advisors for the pro-Chinese 
Communists view provided the emotional backgr und .. 
for the Marshall miss ion to China . 
2 . The Mirshall mission of 1946 . This was based on 
unrealistic view of both Chinese and t,farxism . The 
Chinese yearned for peace in 1946, not Soviet-styled 
reforms , and Marshall's attempt to foist Mao Tse - tung, 
' 
the Communist leader on Chiang was roughly equivalen\ 
say to foist ing Communist Togliatti on the post -war 
Italian government. 
3 . Suppression of the Wedemeyer Report on China in 1947 . 
Jhlle the Wedemexer Report was suppressed Life pub-
lished i ts own William C. Bullitt Report . Had the 
specific recommendations in either the t edemeyer 
Report or the Bullitt .Report for extra mi litary aid 
to China been accepted the United States would not 
be fighting in Korea today . 
4. The White Paper of 1949 and the Acheson ("allo t he 
dus t to settle" } China pol icy , pl us the various 
semi .. o.fficial announcements that "we don tt nmt 
Formos a" as part of the Western Pacific Defense line . 
t 
I 
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CHAPTER IV 
PREDICTIONS MADE BY TIME AND LIFE MAGAZINES 
DURI NG PERIOD FROM 1945 - 1950 
Life - November 1945 - The Chinese Communists are tied to 
Russia. 
'The State Department and many experts on 
Chinese Affairs fel t that Uni ted States 
policy of intervention in Chinese affairs 
forced the Chinese Communists to go ove:r to 
Russian Communism. • 
Life - December 1945 ~Unless Un ited States stops withdrawal 
of Nationalist troops a real civil war wi ll 
be on . 
If we help Chiang Kai-shek over the crest 
and if Russia can be assured we seek no 
special advantages inside China, the Com-
munists can be dealt with s wiftl y . 
•This prediction will never be answered be -
cause of i ts controversial implications .• 
Time - December 1945 - Control of Manchuria by the Chinese 
Communists would constitute a main maj or 
power s hift i n the Far East. 
If the United States does not implement a 
strong policy Chiang Kai-shek ts forces wi ll 
1 be driven from Manchuria and perhaps fram all 
North China by the Communists and China ill 
be divided in t wo . 
Ti me - February 1946 - The worl d woul d long and pai nfull y bear 
t he cross of Yalta•s secrecy . !/ 
Y Appendix C 
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Time - March 1946 - Had the United States fai led to move 
aff irma ti vely and effectively in China, the 
worl d could only have come to the dis-
illus i oning conclusion that the Unit ed States 
democracy was not an exportable commodity . £1 
Life - September 1946 ~ The future peace of the United 
Sta t es and the world depends upon the out-
come of an "irre concilable conflictn . 
•Thi s prediction was made after the f ailure 
of General Marshall to bring ab out recon-
ciliation be tween the Nationalist Government 
and t he Communists. • 
Time - September 1946 - If the United States does not openly 
and quickly give full material. and economic 
support to the Nationalis t Government, China 
mus t pass 'into the Russian orbit . This . wi ll 
only mean a United States strategic retreat 
to the line of the Mariana Island . 
Life - March 1947 - Confl i c t between Russia and United 
States i s inevitable . 
•This thesis is not acceptable to many and 
not proven .' 
Time - October 1947 - Even optimists i n China kne that in 
Manchuria history was passing the eleventh 
hour . 
If China falls into hands of Stalin , all Asia 
including Japan sooner or later will fal l 
into his hands" The manpower and resources 
of Asia will be mobilized agains t us . 
Life - · october 1947 - Wi t hout United States he l p China is 
doomed to pecome a s .atellite of Russ ia . 
tWe know tha t China is a satelli t e of Russia 
now , whether or not we could have saved her 
· _zt Time - March 25, p . 28 ... Mar s hall back in Washington after1 
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ith more a id is s till a highly controversial 
issue. I f ee l e could have saved her in 
_agreement with Life a nd Time. ' 
Time - February 1948 • There are prospects of Far East 
Cominform . 
Life - March 1948 - If we don •t take steps to s top this 
Cornnrunis t conflagration , we are going to 
pay in blood . 
•This prediction has come true.• 
Life - Sep tember 1948 • I f World War III comes it will be a 
duel between Soviet Russia wi th her sa t ellites 
on one hand and United States, the British 
Commonwealth and Western Europe on the other. 
World War III may break out i n Eastern As ia ; 
wherever i t originates , the issue may be 
determined in Eastern Asia . 
· China i n Communist hands would be certain 
prelude to World War III. 
'These predictions have been fUl f illed by 
those who b elieve the war in Korea i s more 
than a war of con tainment • ' 
· 
1 Time - November 1948 - Marshall, right or wrong . The 
question mi ght soon be settled by history . 
The mili tary news indicat ed that he might 
have been tragically wrong for reasons which 
he himself had foreseen ei ght months a go . 'J./ 
· Life - January 1949 - A communist victory in Asia i s a vic-
tory for the Soviet Union and a major d isaster 
for the United States . 
History. may ye t conclude that the end of the 
era pictured here..l!J must rank with the 
greates t tragedies of history . 
' 1/ Time • November 1, Foreign Relations 
~ Era of Kuomintang which began 37 years ago - Jan . 31, 1949 
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Time - January 1949 - Mao Tse-tung victory made a maj or 
change in political and strategic world 
picture on western shores of Pacific . 
' Life - Jul y 1949 - Best part of China by Ame r ican policy 
of passivity. Communists will now go into 
Indo-China, Thailand a nd Burma, Malaya, 
I ndonesia if we do not ac t fast . 
Time - July 1949 - Time a nd Russian tide working against 
Western Nations in Asia . 
Life - August 1949 - The Communist plan to take Formosa 
and all of Asia eventually . 
Time - August 1949 - Danger in China t o United States 
serious as World War II . 2./ 
Time - October 1949 - If the Kremlin coul d visualize the 
kind of military thinking going on i n 
Washington, Russian masters mi ght be even 
happier over their program i n China than 
they are no-.v . 6/ 
Life - December 1949 - The Communi st regi me now completing 
its conquest of Chinese Nationalis t on the 
mainland is an enemy of the United States 
and all the United States stands for in Asia. 
Time - January 19.50 - Communists will have Formosa i n six 
months . 
•If President Truman had not sent the Seventh 
Fleet to Formosa i n June this prediction 
might have proven correct.• 
Life - July 1950 - Hi.s tor y has no irony more cruel for the 
future if we will read it aright. 
Life ,.. December 1950 - History demonstrates unmistakably 
t hat yielding to unjustifiable international 
pressure leads inevitably to war. 
57 Wedemeyer , Senate Foreign Relations Committee §! Time - October 3, p . 18 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Any di scussion of fore i gn policy is largely a stat ement 
I 
of opinion, and opinion is inevitably affected by conscious 
or unconsc ious bias. Any one who enters a controver ial 
fie l d of discussion should be a ble to state a fe basic 
premises upon which rests the judgments, criticisms and 
recommendations put forward . l believe on the issue of our 
China policy during the years covered in this pap er that 
Time and Life have presented a very conscious bias as 
indicated by the opinions and predicti ons recorded here 
and their basic premises I f ound highly acceptable and 
creditable. 
Vmat the United States posi tion shoul d have been in 
China is now a frui tless question , nor i s it fruitful to 
, seek evidence of disloyalty to the United Sta t es amongst 
Americans who be lieved in fact that landlordism was China'S !
1 
' great evil, coali tion is great cure and Communist - United 
States cooperation its great cure. There may ~ell be some 
Communist a gents at work . But their work could not ha ve 
had an important effect had there not been a widespread 
American ignorance of China and a ridespread ignorance of 
the nature of Communi sm. 
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One of the basic premises that the magazi nes failed to 
bring out was the fact that the Communist party i n China 
fitted its words to the stereotyped idea of recent United 
States progressivism, centralized their ac tion, used govern- · 
ment controls and had close organi zation , thi.ngs lacking by 
and large i n. the Central Government of China • 
The Central Government system, or lack of it, w~s wrong , 
therefore the Communis t sy stem mus t b e r i ?flt • This point of ' 
vi ew guided the thinking and consequently the judgment of 
many of those responsible for our policy in the Far East and 
may s till have profound effec t on any action to be taken in 
regard to Chiang Kai-s hek on Formosa as well as our Asiati c 
policy . 
I n contrast to the report on the economic deteriora tion 
and incompetence and corruption in the political and military 
, organi zation in China, Life a nd Time considered them a gainst i 
an all -inclus ive background and did not put a di spropor-
tionate emphasis upon these effects. 
The collapse of our policy in China was our inability 
, to understand the Chinese cu l turally and so made it impos-
' sible to appraise the s itua tion in China sound l y . We tri ed 
to solve China's problems i n terms of western thought. As 
a result we insi sted on the National Government making 
L 
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peace with the Chinese Reds as a price of our support . The 
consequence was a weakening a nd dis credi ting of the Nati onal 
Government and a China s o weakened by war exhaus t ion and 
pos t - ar demorali zation that Communi sm moved in without any 
, extraordinary effort . 
1/ 
Herrymon Maurer - defends Chi ang Kai - shek and hi s 
government on the premise that unt:l.l Communism took over 
China mainland Confucius and Lao- tse had pretty much the 
whole say abou t what and how things should be done in China . 
Conf'ucianism opposed mass literacy movements , machine pro-
duction, the break up of close f'amily living , a nd the ne 
political theories of the West . I n China the idea l lif'e was 
one of tranquil contentment centered around pe ople, babies, 
work , f'ood, soil and nature; it as in no sense a vigorous 
• participation in the course of history . I feel Life and 
Time were prone to place a more political emphasis on our 
poli cy in China during the period we were ins isting that 
Chiang Kai - shek mus t clean out corruption in his government 
and ins titute democratic reforms . 
I n my bibl iography I have attempted to present a l i st 11 
of books by authors who have t aken a definite position on 
our policy in China during the five - year period . As I men-
tioned earlier the issue resolved itself into an all- out 
1/ Maurer , Herrymon, Collision of East and West . 
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support for Chiang Kai • shekts government against a polic y of 
containment. The authors listed in the bibliography pre- · 
sent bot.h views, many most vehemently . 
Of al l the great restern nations, the United States 
is furthest removed by national temperament and tradition 
from a true understanding of Far Eastern social st.ructure. 
We are more di sposed than the European colonial na tions to 
insist t hat our ways are the only effective ays of getting 
things done . Our engineers and advisers ara more apt to be 
i mpatient and disillusioned over the frustration and ap arent· 
irresponsibility encountered in Far Eastern public admini s-
tration . Our investors and merchants have usually been dis -
1 
inclined to follow the long- term polic i es of the Bri ti sh ! 
banks a nd trading companies in . the Far East . e are a pt to 
oscillate too violently between delusions of omnipotence and 
delusions of complete impotence . 
e have a unique opportunity today, in s pite of the 
I. 
propaganda barrage from the Soviet Union. 1Ne can demonstrate 
that a great western po er oan take an active role in t he 
enlightenment and moderni zation of Asiatic p ople without 
. bringing them ei ther under colonial subjugati on or under the 1 
ideological domination of an alien totalit r i anism . 
We suffered a major set back in China , partly because 
too fe were tilling to see the full meaning of the social 
-, 
l 
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forces work ing tl~rew We learned to our cost in China that 
sensible and well-conceived progressive measures for t he 
modernizing of armies and police forces, the re forms of 
currencies or educational s ystems, or the introduct ion of 
more truly representative forms of government; can all b e 
sabotaged or perverted by small groups of old-guard poli tiaa 
cliques . These groups can undermine this ork of the small 
admini strative and manageri al class on whom falls the main 
responsibility of the traditional society and ec onomy . As 
in China not only the s mall grm1p of the old - guard political 
clique were obstructing Chiang Kai-shek but also t he Com-
muni sts wh~ for the sake of supporting Soviet policy , 
deliberately created disorder. 
Whatever the military results of the United Nat ions 
,, 
campaign in Korea may be, the ~·e s tern world faces the danger 
that before long an Iron Curtain may be down over East Asia I 
and shut out all Western influence as rigidly as it is no 
excluded from Eastern Europe . Instead of seeing the rising 
tides of nationalism in Eastern Asi a canalized into con-
atructi ve channels with the he l p of the United States and 
' the other Wes tern democracies, there is now every indication I 
that we will see t hem canal ized into channels prepared for II 
the people of Asia by the planners in Moscow. 
I' 
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Our national policy is founded upon t he United Na tions 
but it would be a tragic mistake for us to agree to any 
admissi on by the United Na tions that the a ggres sion of the 
North Korean Communists and of the Chinese Communists , 
a ided and abetted by t he Sovie t Communists , can be permitted 
to a chieve the ends that we1 .. e sought . It wou l d be a grea t 
mistake for us to le t the Communist Government of China have 
a s eat in the United Na tions unless it offici ally rec ognizee 
that it has been guilty of aggression , offers r eparation for 
its a cts of a ggression, a nd a grees that a united people of 
Korea shall freely determine their own destinies under the 
au s p:l.ces and supervision of the United Na ti ons . 
The United States shoul d not consent to the re turn of 
' Formosa until t he United Nati ons has f ully considered the 
bes t interest of the people of Formosa . She shoul d not 
per mit the cession of Formosa to Chine. unt il a recogni zed 
Chinese Government that has been admitted to the United 
Na ti ons a grees to the establi s hment upon that i sland of the 
1 United Na tions a ir and naval bases upon which President 
gj 
Roosevelt fas s o i ns is t ent . 
Becaus e present conditions t hroughout Asia aro s o 
uncertain , 'li'it h the former fri endly China rapidly becoming 
a Mosco - domi na ted and hostile po er , the United States must ,' 
y Wells, Sumnei', Seven Decisions Tha t Shaped History . 
' 
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,, 
whatever . the s train upon her national resources , maintain her 
defense outposts from the Aleuti ans t hrough J ?an , Okina~a , 
Formosa and the Phil l ipines; and maint ain them in such a 
manner that Communi s t ag'--'ression a gainst any part of our 
defense line can be successfully repelled . 
II 
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Appendix A 
CHRONOLOGY 
January 1945 to December 31, 1950 
January 26 - The White House made public a report to Pres iden t 
Roosevelt from his personal representative, Donald M. 
Nelson, whi ch said China ts economic war effort was nov, 
coordinated for the first time and in addition to the 
i mprovement in the military situation , we can now look 
for far-reaching gains in the economic front. 
February 6 - "Big Threen conference at Yalta in the Crimea 
with Winston Churchill , President Roosevelt and Premier 
Joseph Stalin to discuss problems of a secure peace . 
Agreements were made for joint military operations in 
the final phase of the war. 
February 12 - Agreement signed at Yalta between President 
Roosevelt , Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin . 
February 14. - Chinese Communists and Nationalist Government 
negotiating their differences with the aid of United 
States Ambassador, ~ .ajor General Patrick Hurley. Com-
munists rejected a four -point proposal made by the 
Goverr~ent, whi ch then made new proposals. 
February 15 - The u. s . Commander in China, Lieutenant Al bert 
c . Wedemeyer , stated that he bad no power to give militar~ 
aid to the guerrilla fi ghters of the Chinese Communists 
and t hat all u. s . officers i n China were required to 
si gn a statement that they would not give assistance to 
individuals or organi zations other than those affiliated 
with the Chungking government . 
February 26- Senator Hugh Butler (R), Nebraska, de manded in 
the Senate that President Roosevelt give Congress e. full 
account of decisions reached at Yalta Conference. 
March 5 - United States invited thirty~nine nations to attend 
San Francisco Conference i n April to draw up plans for an 
international organization to maintain peace. Chine. , 
Britai n and Russia joined in t he invitation. 
March 6 - New Chinese Constitution Assembly announced by 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai -shek, where all parties will en-joy equal rights, to convene November 12. Appeal made to 
Communists to incorporate their armed forces and local 
administration in the National Army . 
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March 10 - Foreign Economic Administration officials completed 
$1,000,000,000 postwar five - year industrialization plan 
for China and submitted it to Chines e government. 
March 23 - The Yenan wireless reports that an appeal has been 
made to the "Big Three" that the Chinese Communists be 
represented at the San Francisco parley . 
Apri l 1 - United States Government proposed Washi ngton Con-
ference ith Great Britain , Russia, France and China to 
wor k out an agreement on mandates. The u. s. advocated 
development of self-government. 
1 
1 April 17 - U. N.R.R.A. reported China will require 
$ 7,500,000,000 of which U! N.R. R.A. will provide 
$2,000,000,000. 
~_j· 
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April 25 - The United Nations Conference on Int ernational 
Organi zation, spons ored by Great Bri tain, the Soviet 
Union, Chi na and the u. s ., a nd attended by dele gates 
from forty-six nations , began i n San rrancisco . I~s 
purpose was to draw up a or l d security organization 
bas ed on the Dunbarton Oaks proposal. 
Apri l 28 ... Chungking repor t ed that .Major General Patr ick J. 
May 
May 
Hurley, u. s . Ambasaador to China, said that the U. s., 
Great Bri tain and Russia were in agreement abo~t China, 
favoring its unification . 
13 - Chinese Communists threaten the puppe t state of 
Manchuko . 
. I 
19 - Sixth Nati onal Kuomintang Congress approved resol ution \ 
cal ling for legalization of other pol itical groups aside 
from the Government party. 
May 31 ~ Chiang Kai-Shek resigned a s President of the Executive! 
Yuan , s ucceeded by Acting Premier Dr. T. v. Soong . Chiang 
remai ned as President of China . 
June 18 - Communists decided not t o partici pa te in People •s 
Political Council because of Government's rejection of 
request by the party for the formation of a coalition 
government . 
June 29 - Chinese Communists gave a pproval to visit by seven · 
non- partisan members of the People•s Political Council 
at Yenan to discuss problems .between t he Communists and 
Nationalists regime. 
July 7 -The Fourth People's Political Council opened in Chung-
king wi thout the Communists who refused to participate . 
July 17 - President Truman, Prime Minis ter Churchill and 
Premier Sta lin began conference in Potsdam . 
July 19 - The National Assembly postponed, · scheduled for 
November 12. The P. P. c. urged the utmost efforts be 
made to resolve differences with the Commun.ists. 
August 8 - Three months after end of war in Europe, Russia 
declared war upon Japan and thus joined her Western 
allies in the Pacific. 
August 12 - Chiang aoked Communists not to take independent 
action in occupying areas enemy held . 
August 1~ - War with Japan ends. 
Sino- Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance 
signed . ];./ 
Communists refused to obey Chiang and proceeded to 
disarm Japanese troops . 
August 16 -Chinese Communists asked u. s . , Britain and Russia 
for representation in Japanese surrender . 
Chinese Communists requested U. s . to stop Lend-
Lease to Chungking regime. 
August 20 - Russian troops entered Mukden , Harbin, Changchun. 
Chiang asked Mao to confer with him on inter-
national and internal problems. 
August 24 - T. V . Soong, Chinese Premi~r, asked for 
\ 2 , 000 , 000 , 000 credit for Chinese rehabilitation . 
August 27 - Ray F . Hendrickson, Acting Director General U. N. 
R.R.A. stepping up relief shipments to China . 
Dean Acheson sworn in as Under Secretary of State . 
General George c. Marshall appointed as Special 
Envoy to China by President Tr11man • 
• a.o accepted third bid to visit Chungking . 
!/rut! text in Current History, Vol. 9 , P • 329-38 , 1945. 
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September 1 - Council of Foreign Ministers met in London -
Britain, U. s., Russia, France, China. 
I 
1 
September 29 - Central Governmen t and Chinese Communists have 
1 agreed to s ubmi t their outstanding differences in a 
poli tical council whose decisions woul d be binding . 
~~=~=,:· 
I: 
October 11 - Communist-Central Government agreement a limi ted 
one. 
October 22 - General Wedemeyer to cut troops to 6 ,000 by 
January 1, but 53,000 marines will remain to help t he 
Chinese clear out 4,000,000 Japanese from China, Korea 
Formosa. 
Plebiscite i n Mongolia. 
October 25 - Russia a greed to e vacuate Jehol as soon as 
Chi nese. Central Government forces arrive. 
October 27 - K. c. Wu , Minister of I nformation , announced 
that Central Government a greed to allow Communist forces 
to retain their North China territory if rail ay zones 
are evacuated and trains allowed free operation. 
October 31 - Yenan rejected Central Government reques t of 
October 27. 
November 7 - Secretary of State J ames F. Byrnes in 
and Ld.eutenant General Albert c. Wedemeyer, U. 
mander in China stated that U. s. marines will 
called from China . 
as hington 
S. Com-
be re-
November 9 - Communists addressed a protest to President 
Truman against armed i n tervention in Chinese i nternal 
affairs. 
November 27 - General Patrick Hurley resi gned as Ambassador 
to China, contending that influences wi t h i n the State 
Department had defeated h is efforts to carry out the 
Administration's policy . 
President Truman appointed General George C. 
Marshall as his special envoy to China with the rank of 
Ambassador. 
December 18 - General Wedemeyer was authorized by State De-
partment to assist movement of Nationalist troops to 
Man churia ports if deemed necessary by General Marshall. 
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December 20 - Communist General Chou En-lai proposed an un-
conditional truce between troops while peace negotiations 
are under way. 
De a ember 21 - General George C. Marshall arrived in China . 
December 27 - Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Russia, Great 
Britain and the u. s. at Moscow ended after eleven days . 
I 
I 
1946 
January 3 - Chinese Communists accept Chiang Kai-Shek •s 
prospect to have General George Marshall as mediator in 
the current strife. 
January 5 - The Government announces recogniti on of Outer 
ongolia . 
January 10 - President Chiang Kai - Shek with Communis t repre -
senta:t:;i ves meeting with General Marshall agreed on formal 
truce . Proclaimed a series of poll tical and democra·t;ic 
reforms . 
January 15 -Chinese Communists on P. P. c. agree on retaining 
Chiang as head of the proposed all-party government; pro-
posed disbanding all puppet armies and ending military 
conscription at once. 
January 17 - The Export-Import Bank approved ~ 33,000,000 credi 
loan to China to help export. c,otton. 
January 29 - State Secretary Byrnes confirmed that President 
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agreed at Yalta to let 
Russia have Kurilu, Southern Sakhal in and small adjacent 
island. 
The Communist Party Central Committee approved 
the proposed new constitution to be drafted i n Chungking . 
January 31 - P. P. c. approved plan to set up coalition govern 
ment, draft a c onstituti on , to reorganize armies a nd the 
National Assembly. 
February 5 - The House Naval Affairs Committee approved the 
Vinson Bill for naval aid to China. 
February 11 - Washington and London published the text of the 
Secret Yalta Agreement sigrted February 11, 1945 by 
Roosevelt , Churchilland Stalin in which Russ ia agreed 
to declare war on J apan "in two or t hree months" after 
Germany surrendered 11 in r e turn for concessions" .. 2 /' 
. -· 
Government- Communist agreements made to restore 
e ight disrupted railways in North China. 
sl See Appendix c - Complete text of agreement in Current 
Histor y . 
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February. 15 - Russia has been reported demending ec onomic eon-
cessions end taking industrial e quipment from Manchuria . 
-vashington sent note to Chungki ng as king for information 
on Russian-Chinese talks. 
I n Yenan the Communist par ty demand s joint con~ 
trol of Manchuria . 
February 16. - U. S. government are transportin government 
troops to Manchuria. 
February 17 - Nationalist-Communist figh t ing resumed in !;ian-
. churl a. {The January lOth truce did not cover this area.) 
February 23 - Centr a l Yenan protests to the U. s . Foreign 
Office agains t the Yalta Agreement . J/ 
February 24 - Unifi cat i on agreement between Comrrffinists and 
Nationalists sigr-ed in Chungking by Genera l Chang Chung , 
General Chou En-lai und General George Marshall. 
Chiang rejects Russ i a's demand for economic 
.c oncessions . 
February 26 - Russia r eports evacuation of Manchur ia before 
American troops leave China . 
March 1 - u. s . State Department cri tic i zes Russian removal of 
J apanese industrial equipnent from Manchuria. 
March 5 - U. s. State Department dispatched note to Russia 
protesting against Soviet clnims to Japanese enterpr ises 
in Ma~ch~ria as war booty . 
March 9 - Chungking reports that Russian troops are evacuat i ng 
Manchur ia . 
March 12 - The House pas sed and s ent to Senate 313- 329 bill 
allowing President to send techni cal advisors and lease 
01~ give 271 naval vessels to China. 
General 1-larshall persuaded Government end Communists 
to extend authority of Pe iping • .~eadquarters for enforc ing 
truce to Manchuria area not held by Russ ians. 
March 16 - General Marshall s tated in Vlashington "situation 
critical" . 
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I! j April 1 - General Wedemeyer announced U. s . Army in China 
1 theatre wi ll disband May 1. 3,000 troops remain. 
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April 4 - General Chou En-lai expressed opposition to any 
Allied loans until present government reorganized . 
April 14 - All-out hos tilities start again. 
April 22 - Communists refuse to p articipate in National 
Assembly, May 5, as long as civil war is goin~ on. 
Apri l 2h - Constitutional assembly postponed indefinitely. 
Communists take over Harbin , Manchuria as 
Russians leave, 
April 29 - Chiang Kai - shek rejected terms approved by General 
Marshall which would have left Communis ts in possessi on 
of Changdlm and alm.os t 90% of Manchuria . 
May 3 - General ~arshall•s new peace proposal rej ected . 
May 14 - Chinese Communists isolate Nat ionalists in Manchuria. 
May 30 - General Marshall appeals to both sides to stop 
fighting . I 
I 
, June 20 - Communists reject GovernmAnt proposal that General I 
:Ma rshall be g iven supreme arbit,ration power in peace talks. 
June 23 - Chinese Communists demand evacuation of all u. s . 
forces from China . 
J une 28 - u. S. Acting Secretary of Sta te Dean Aches on stated 
in Washingt on U. s . policy barring interference i n 
Chinese internal affairs and helping nation to recover . 
July 9 - Dr . Lei ghton Stuart appoi nted Ambassador to China. 
July 16 - President Truman s igned bill transferring war ships 
to China. 
I 
I' 
! 
July 27 - Government rejected Communists proposal for uncon- 11 
ditional cessation of hostilities. 
August 9 - Truce along Western front went into effect August 16J. 
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U. S . State Department announced intention of with- il 
drawing marines from China. ~ 
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I I ~- ~~~~~~ August 14 - Chiang promises to e nd Kuomintang rule and in- -~-~~ --
1 s titute a constitutional government without delay. 
I 
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Augus t 19 - Communists begin full seale war a gainst 
Na tionali s ts . 
Aug1,1st 22 - Communists es t ablish a Communis t Government in 
Manchuria under provisional administration . 
Augus t 31 - ·c onc lusion of Chinese-American sur pl us property 
agreement. 
September 8 - General Chou En-lai says h:l.s party will not seek 
aid from Rus s ia. 
September 12 - Marshall tries to get Communist-Nati onalis t 
negotiations started a gain. 
September 19- General Chou En-lai leaves peace ne gotiations. 
October 2 - The Government lists its maximum concessions to 
the Communis ts in a note to General Marshall and. 
Ambassador Stuart. 
October 8 - Communists r eject t en-day peac e proposal . 
October 16 - Chiang makes n e 1 e ight- point proposal to 
C onununi s ts • 
October 29 - San Francisco Conference proposed a t closi ng 
session resolution calling on President Truman to s eek 
u. s. -Russian mediation on war in China and urging 
withdrawal of United States tro ops from China. 
November 4 - China and U. s . Signed five-year Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation . 
Novembe r 8 - Chiang i nvited Communists to take part in Con-
stitutional Assembl y me eting . Communists refused . 
November 15 - Constitutional .Assembly convened in Nanking 
afte r postponement fi ve ti mes i n ten years despi t e 
boycott by Communists . 
Young China Party reversed and submitted list 
of delegates . 
December 6 - Communis ts notify General Marshall they \rlll not 
resume peac e negotiations until di ssolution of " illegal" 
Constitutiona l Assembly . 
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December 18 - President Truman issued a 3,500 word statement 
on u. s . policy toward China. Warns Chinese civi l war 
a nthreat to world stabi l ity or peace" . Tol d reporters 
Marshall wi ll rema in in 'China as long as necessary. 
,! December 25 - Present re vol utionary government i s replaced 
1: January 1 by t he first cons t itutional government of China . 
[I 
!I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
_l_ 
---=-====--r~ 
I ~ 
I 
84 
===-=-=- =·-~--~ --·-=- - -
1947 
January 7 - u. s~ State Department officially requested 
Soviet Union to turn over control of Darien to China 
i mmedi ately . 
General Mars hall appointed Secretary of State. 
January 29 - 'fhe U. S. State Department announced aband onment . 
of U. S. effort to mediate between Chinese goverlli~ent 
and Communists. 
April 1 - U. s. Navy authorities i n China announced with-
drawal of 4., 0 00 mari ne s from China t o Guam. 
April 7 - Russia charged u. s. had failed to withdraw its 
troops f rom China~ 
April 26 - President Truman ordered transfer of unspecif ied 
number of surplus ships to China. 
May 31 - P. P. c . asked Government to i ni tiate negotiations 
with u. s. for loans to be used exclusively for national 
rehabilitation. 
June 27 -American State Department a rmounced u. s . wou l d sell 
130 millions of small-arms ammunition t o Chinn at one -
tenth original cost. 
July 12 - President Truman appointed Lieutenant General 
Albert C. ~edemeyer head of f~ct-find ing mission to China 
a nd Korea. 
1 July 30 - U.N.R.R.A. announced i n ~ashi ngton suspens i on of 
shipments to bo th Government and Communist areas in North 
China. 
August 13 - The U. S. State Department protested to U.S.S . R. 
over cont i nued occupation of Darien and procras tinatibn 
i n making port available to world s hippi ng . 
1 August 24 - General Wedemeyer issued stateme nt stressing need 
for political and economi c reforms i n China .4/ · 
September 2 - Premier Chang Chun declared .China would not alter [ 
her domestic or forei gn policy as results of ed m~yer 
mission. 
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1, September 10 - U. S . government reached a greement on main 
principle govern i ng use of China ' s share of 350 millions 
u. S. relief appropriation for needy foreign countries. 
October 13 - William c. Bullitt, former u. s . Ambassador to · 
Rus sia, advocat~s immediate aid to China . 2/ 
October 20- The report made by Lieutenant General Al bert c . 
Wedemeyer will remain s ec r et, Stat e Department officials 
announce. The report they s ay might prove ha rmful to the 
i nteres~ of the two countries. 
I 
I 
December 8 - China and U. S . reac hed a greement regarding trans-r 
fer of U. S . vessels to China and training Chinese naval 11 
personnel. 
,2/ t11'e Magazine, October 13 , 1947 - B'u.llitt Report on China 
to the American People. lj 
J''=-== 
il 
- l- -==== 
I: 
I' 
I 
i 
I 
1/ 87 II 
II jl 
li ===----====c-~~L-~ 
., 
I . 
' 
1948 
January 6 - U. S. challenged U.s. s .R. on whether Japanese army 
equi pment cap tured i n Manchuria by the Soviet Union had 
been turned over to China Communists. 
Fe bruary 7 ~ China seeks ·3 milliop from the U. s. in addition 
t o the ~570 mi l lion s he will z•eee_ ve a s paz•t of the world 
recove r y program ~ The money is needed to s upport the 
Chinese currency . 
February 18 - Pres ident Truman sent mes sage to Congress r e -
ques ting U. S. 570 mi llion for e.id to China wntil June 
30 , 1949, of r..rhich U. S. ~;510 million wou l d be utili zed 
f or food and relief a nd U. S. \60 million f or r econ-
s truction . 
1 March 26 - The Senate F'ore i gn Relations Committee formally 
recommend ed a $463 million China-aid bill . 
March 29 - China's Firs t National Assembly convened . 
March 30 - The Senate pas s ed the ~463 million China r e l ief bill j 
Apr il 19 - Chiang Kai - shek was elected China •s first presiden t 
under new constitution . 
1 Apri l 21 - The National Ass embl y pas sed resoluti on asking 
U.s .s . R. to abi de by 19!~5 Sino- Soviet treaty §./, and 
re tur n immediately to China all machi nery and m terial 
removed from Manchuria . 
April 29 - Although strongly opposed by the Kuomintang mac hine , 
General Li Tsung- jen is elected by t he Assembly as the 
Vice Pres ident of China. 
May 7 - Chine.•s first constitutional parliamen t s cheduled to 
meet . 
Ma y 11 - China is granted $36 mi llion for food~ cotton , 
pe troleum and f ertilizer under Forei gn Assi s tant Act . 
July 3 ~ Ec onomic Aid Agreement between China and U. S . ~as 
signed in Nanking . 
August 5 - Sino-American agreement for the es tab l ishment of a 
J oint Commission on Rura l Recons truc tion was signed i n 
Nanki ng . 
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October 3 - A House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee urged t hat 
China receive greater financial aid from the u. s. and 
called for outri ght military assistanoe · to the Chinese 
Nationalist GoverrELent . 
Octo e r 13 - A high De fense Mi nistry official declared that 
although the American State Department had transferred 
··>88 ,275 ,000 in mill tary aid funds to the Chinese govern-
ment since ~pril, nnot a single t hing bought ith t hese 
fllnd s bas yet arrived in China" . 
October 31 - President Chiang said nif China ts northeast 
could not be kept intact, Far Eas tern peace would be 
impossible" . 
November 2 - The Post Off ice Department suspended all U. s . 
mail service to Aanchuri a because of uns e ttled conditions 
November 3 - It is estimated supplies captured by Com..-nunists 
in Mm1churia far surpas s all the military equipment that 
Chi na is scheduled to receive under the U. S . 125 
million military aid program . 
November 22 - Madame Chiang Kai - shek in radio broadcast 
appealed to u. s. for aid. 
November 2 .5 - Ambas s ador ellington Koo appea led to President 
Truman for u. s. aid . 
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1949 
January 14 - Chinese Communists made an e ight-point proposal 
for peace negotiations. 
January 20 - Chinese Government received replies from three 
governments - U. s ., Great Britain ~~d the Soviet Uni on -
in answer to a memorandum i nquiring as to t he res pective 
government '·S atti ·tude towa rd the peac·eful sett lement of 
China's civil stri fe . Rep lies to effec t tr.,a t it as 
difficult to mediate i n t he government-communis t dispu te. 
J anuary 21 - President Chiang Kai-shek announced retirement 
from the pres ldency of China. Vice President Li was to 
exercise presidential powers. 
March 31 - C o~~unists announced that peace ne gotiations would 
be held in close meetings . 
April 27 - Government recalled peace delegations from Peiping . 
Chiang Kai-shek issued statements of his de terminati on 
t o suppress communis t rebellion . 
May 12 - Mi nistry of Foreign Affairs s pokesman in Canton said 
China's foreign policy remained unchanged . 
Warships 'l'ai-Hu and Tai -C' :~. oa presented to China by 
U. s. arrived in Taiwan. 
Ma y 27 - All Nationalists resistance in Shanghai collapses . 
Woosing falls . Chines e Reds i n complete control of 
Vlhangpoo River . 
May 29 - U. S. Consulat:;e General i n Mukd en c l ose s down . The 
Soviet Union c l oses i ts consul ate in Shanghai . 
June 2 - National i s ts begin evacuation of Ts i ngtao , las t 
stronghold in the North . 
June 6 - Yen Hei-hau, new premier, trying to form a non-
partisan war cabinet; to continue the resis tance to 
communism. 
June 22 - Dr . Kan Chuh- hau presents President Truman with a 
plan for Chinese Na ti onalist d efense a gainst the Com-
munists and f or U. S . aid to the Na t i onali st regime . 
June 30 - President 'I'ruman asserts that our Far Eastern policy 
is b eing developed on the same non- par t isan basis as its 
~lropean policy. His .remarks made to c ompl aint by John 
Foster Dulles and Senator H. Alexander Smi th of New 
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Jersey and other Repilblicans that they ere not consulted 
on Chinese policy . 
July 4 - President Chiang Kai -shek asserted that as a 
revol utlona;ry he was determined to fight Communists to 
the end . Appealed for American Aid and pointed out that 
Chinese Communists were carrying out the policies of 
i nternati onal corr~unism . 
Ju l y 22 - Communists closed down U. s . Information Ser~rice in 
Tsentien office . 
Ju l y 30 - State Depar tment formally announced the appointment 
of Raymond D. Fosdick , former resident of Rockefeller 
Foundation, and Dr . Everett Case, President of Colgate 
University, as consultants to Secretary of State Acheson 
in the projected complete review of the u. S . policy 
r egarding the Far East . 
August 5 - The u. s. Government issued a 1lu te paper called 
11United States Relations with China" . 1/ 
August 16 - State Department officer announced American 
diplomatic and consular representatives ill f ollow the 
Chinese Nationalist Government \· hen it leatres Canton . 
September 21 - Communi s t leader Mao 'l'se - tung announced 
es tablishment of Peoples Republic of China in Pelpin, • 
September 22 - Chinese delegate to U. N. asked nations to pay 
due attention to t h e Chinese situation , accused U. .s . R. 
of undermin~ng peace in Far East . 
Sep tember 27 - China filed compl aint in the U. l . General 
Assembly agains t U.s .s .R. accusing latter of aiding 
Chinese Communists in the civil war and violating the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 §/ and the charter of the 
United N. tiona. 
October 1 - All foreign governments we r e notified that the 
new Comrnuniat gove:ronment is wi lling to "establish 
diplomati~ ~~latione with any foreign government that 
would be willing to observe pr inciples of equality, mutua 
benefits and mutual re.~pact of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty . 11 
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October 2 - U.s.s.R . announced r e cognition of puppe t communist 
government in Pe iping . 
Oc tober 3 - F'oreign Minister George Yeh announced t hat China 
severed diplomatic relations wi th U.S .S . R. 
Oc tober 4 - Pol and , Hungary, Czechoslovakia recogni ze ne 
Chine s e Communist government . 
U. S. Department of State i ssued a s tatement re -
affirming U. S . recognition of the National government 
as the legal government of China . 
October 17 - Chinese Corr.munists concluded secret pact wi th 
Russ ia in Harbin , g iving Russia virtual c ont1•ol of' China ' f · 
political , economic and military affairs . 9./ 
October 20 - Six U •. S . Congr•essmen appealed for China aid and 
non- recognit;ion o f' Chinese Communist regime . 
November 22 - Genera lissimo Chiang Kai - shek .sent l~epresentatiEE s 
to General Li Tsung-jen in an eff or t to persuade him to 
resume his post as Ac t ing Pres ident in Chungking . 
General Li is under medical care in ~ ongkong . 
November 25 - T. F) . Tsiang charged U.s .s .R. ith violating 
the U.N . charter a nd t he Sino-Sovie t Treaty of 1945 10/ 
a t the openi ng deba te of the Poll tical Comrni ttee of U-:lf. 
Ge e ral As sembl y . 
November 20 - The S .s . Si r John Fr ankl in v1as fired upon by 
Chinese Nationalist war vessels enforcing closure of 
Shanghai harbor . 
November 30 - Chiang Ka i - shek repor t s loss of Chungking . New 
National ist capi tal moved to Chengtu . 
Dec embe r 1 - Senator Alexander Smit~ of New Jersey , member of 
the Senate Foreign Rela tions Committee, r ecomme nded that 
the u. s . send troops into Formosa to occupy it 
indefinitely . 
Dece1nber 2 - The U. S . requested China to stop f'urthel" a ttaek 
on Americ an vessels . 
1
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December 9 - C~binet s tarted functioning in Taipeh . 
December 16 ~ ~ao Tse ~tung ar~ived in Moscow. 
. ! ~ ' . 
December 17 - U~ S. State De partment classified Shanghai as a 
ttzone of Dangern hazardous for American shipping . 
December 23 - Chinese Ambassador, Wellington Koo , asked u. s. 
State Department for American assistance to Tai an 
(Formosa). 
December 30- India recognized ChlneseCommunist regi me. 
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1950 
January 1 - Briti.sh government severed relations wi th 
Nationalist government on Formosa. 
January 5 - President Truman ruled out American defense of 
Formosa • .!..!/ Policy statement ... u. s. traditional Open 
Door policy in China, its pledges at Yalta and Potsdam 
to give Formosa back to China when Japan as defeated 
and a U. N. resolution in December 1949 against outside 
i nterference in China were behind his decision. 
Acheson declared the Truman announcement was proof 
to the worl d that the u. S. would keep earlier promises 
of hands-off China. 
Britain recogni zed the Communist Government or 
China, 
January 6 - British government grants de jure recognition to 
Chinese Communist government. 
January 11 - Secretary Acheson had placed the U. s. first line 
of defense in the Western Pacific, Okinawa and the 
Phillipines - Formosa excluded. 
January 12 - State Secretary Aches-on accused Russia of grabbing 
Chinese territory. He said the u.s. Counted on t hi s 
t~~ning the. Far East against Communism. 12/ He asserted 
t ha t the single most important fact shaping U.s. policy 
in the Far East is annexation by the Soviet Union or four 
northern areas of China. He declared tha t this would 
bring upon Russia the nhatred and righteous anger of the 
Chinese people." 
President Truman reaffirmed his "hands off 
Formosa" policy in face of much Republican criticism. 
January 13 • Russia began a boycott of principal u. N. 
Agencies over the China issue. 
January 14 - Red China seized the u. s. consulate in Peiping . 
Complete withdrawal of American diplomatic 
representation from mainland of China ordered by 
Secretary of State Acheson as result of seizure or u.s. 
Consular office in Peiping . ll/ 
1U pendix I 
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January 16 -Dr. Phillip Jessup, U. s. Ambassador at Large, 
Confers with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on For mosa. 
January 21 - Russia denied and the u. s. reiterated that the 
Soviets were absorbing Manchuria and other parts of North 
China • 1:!t/ 
January 26 - Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and General 
Omar Bradley, chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved 
before Senate Foreign Relatione Committee. They asserted 
that at no time have the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Depart-
ment of Defense rec ommended any occupation of Formosa by 
U. S. They also eXpressed views while Formosa is of 
strategic significance to the u. s. in the hands of an 
enemy , its significance would not warrant the use of our 
armed forces to occupy it. 
J anuary 28 - Secret Soviet-Chinese Communist Treaty. !2/ 
J anuary 30 - Loris Craig, E. c. A· Administrator for Formosa, 
says about $.3,500,000 of nonmilitary ai d monthl y woul d 
save Formosa from economi c collapse and prevent Com-
munist inroads. 
January .31 -u.s. House Foreign Affairs Committee approved 
17-1 a bill authorizi ng E .C.A. s pending to help non-
Communist Chinese through June 30. 
February 14 - Russia and Red .china si gned a 30-year pact . !£1 
President Truman si6ned Formosa-Korea Aid Bill: 
authorized withdrawals on a ~103 million China Aid fund 
through June 30. The State Department said only 28 
million of the China fund was originally earmarked for 
Formosa and estimated that not more than $10.5 mi llion 
could be used for Formosa by June 30. 
March 1 - Chiang Kai-shek reclaims presidency. With backing 
of Kuomintang Standing Committee and Nationalist Legis-
lature Yuan on Formosa, he announced he was taking back · 
presidency fr om General Li Tsung-jen, Acting President 
since Chiang ts retirement January 21, 1949• _ 
March 8 - Secretary General Trygve Lie implied that t he U.N. 
should admit Red China. 
![! Mr . Acheson's s peech before National Press Club in 
Washington on January 12. 
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March 12 - Premier Chen Cheng appointed a new Nationalist 
Cabinet made up of comparatively liberal and young 
Kuomintang members. 
Marc h 27 - Russia staged t :.ro more walkouts over China issue . 
April 16 - Owen Lattimore said in a Philadelphia s peec h the 
U. S. s hould :.ri thdraw its support of Chiang Kai ... shek and 
permit the U.N. to seat the Chinese Communists. 
April 17 - Formosa asks u. s. aid as the best anti-Communist 
investment America ever made. 
May 5 - Formosa appeals for u. s . mi litary aid. 
May 15- Vice Admiral Russells . Berkey, u. s . Navy Public 
Information Director, charged in a New York sp eech "The 
Chinese Communists would still be north of the Great Wal l 
if' certain u. s. arms and shipments to the Nationalists 
two years ago had not been delayed because somebody in 
the u. s. slipped up, bogged down or was interfered with . 
May 25 -U.N. Secretary Trygve Lie is trying to get the 
Security Council Big Four (U.s., Russia, Britain, France) 
to settle the issue of Chinese representation in the U.N. 
June 7 -Acheson told ne :.r conference that u. S. will not be 
"coerced by Soviet walkouts into admitting Red China to 
U. N.'* 
June 27 - "Hands-off Formosa" polic 
oo over respons y o e ending the 
island. The Nationalists a greed to stop making raids on 
the Communist - held Chinese mainland. 
President Truman ordered u. S. Seventh Fleet to 
protect Formosa. 
June 29 - President Truman said U. S. not at war but was exe-
cuting a U •. N. Police action in Korea. 
June 30 - Nationalist China offered 33,000 seas oned troops 
with air and sea support for Korea . 
July 15 - I f the Chinese Communists are given Chinats seat on 
Security Council, Russia is willing to return to the 
Council and help negotiate for peace in Korea, Stalin 
said in note to Nehru . 
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August 1 - General Douglas Macarthur and Chiang Kai-s hek meet 
on Formosa to coordina.te plans for Formosa ts defense in 
event of Chinese Communist invasion attempt. 
Russia returns t o u. N. Security Counc i l, fails in 
move to expel Nationalist China. 
August 10 - U. S. denied that its decision to defend Formosa 
means i t is giving Chiang Kai -shek poli tical backing . 
August 24 - Communi$t China demanded that u. N. Security 
Council order U. S . armed forces (7th Fleet) to withdraw 
from Formosa. 
August 26 - The day the Formosa policy was issued in the u. N. 
Truman learned MacArthur had sent v.F.W. heros a measage 
on Formosa military importance. 
Augus t 30 - President Truman ordered General MacArthur to t ake 
back a statement . on making Formosa a U. S . stronghold. 
September 6 - General MacArthur•s view that u.s. should turn 
Formosa into defense base was endorsed by retired Admiral 
Denfield. President Truman "the U.S. will defend Formosa 
only during Korean war and wants international decision 
as to its f uture. · 
U. s. supplies (Acheson) being sent to Formo'Sa 
were only for island's defense. 
September 29 - Security Counc i l on Lake Success voted to invite. 
Chinese Communists to appear at first Council sesston aft~. 
November 15 and discus s their complaint against U. s. 
"aggression" in Formosa. · 
November 1 - Chinese Communists enter fight in Korea. 
November 10 - u. s. tried to get Red China t o quit Korean War 
on promise Man churian interests would be prot ected . 
November 23 - Assurance given Chinese Communists U. N. forces 
would not menace Manchuria and Red China could safely 
withdraw her troops. 
November 30 - Chiang Kai - shek•s offer of 33,000 t roops to 
defend Korea. 
December 22 - Chinese Reds massed for drive on Seoul, rejected 
U. N. cease-fire pleas . 
Chinese Communists assets in u. s. frozen. 
U. s. assets i n Red China seized. 
December 29 - U. S. charge Chinese helped plot Korean at·t;ack 
in June. 
!,_ 
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PRES IDENT TRU~4N • S STATEMENT OF' POLI CY 
DEC EMBER 15 1 1945 
A~pendix 
To cope with the i ncreasingl y di f ficult Chi na pr oblem, 
Pres ident Tr uman on November 27, 1945, appoi nted Gener al of 
the Ar my George c. Marshall, retir.ing Chief of St af f, as 
his s pecial envoy to Chi na with the rank of Ambassador . I n 
his i ns truc t ions t o General Marshall, and i n a s t atement of 
December 15, President Truman outlined American policy toward 
China . He stated : 
••• It is the firm belief of t his government t hat a strong , 
uni ted , a nd democrati c China i s of t he u t mos t impor tanc e 
to t he success of thi s Uni ted Nations Organi zat ion and 
for world peace. A China disorganized and divided ei ther 
by forei gn aggression , such as that undertaken by t he 
Japanese, or by violent internal strife i s an undermi ning 
i nfluence to world stability and peace, now and i n the 
f u ture. The United States Government b as long subscr ibed 
to the principle that t he management of i nternal affairs 
is t he responsibility of t he peoples of the sovereign 
nations. Events of this century, however, would i ndicate 
that a breach of peace anywhere i n the world threatens the 
peace of t he entire world . I t is thus i n the most vital 
i n terest of the United States and all t he United Nations 
t ha t the people of China overlook no opportunity to ad jus t 
their i n ternal differences promptly by methods of peaceful 
negot iation . 
The Government of t he United States believes i t 
essential: 
(1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between 
t he armies of the National Government and the Chinese 
Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for 
the purpose of completing · t he return of all China to 
effective Chinese control, i ncluding the i mmed iate 
evacuation of t he Japanese forces. 
(2) That a national conference of representatives 
of major poli t ical elements be arranged to develop an 
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early solution to the present internal strife - a solu-
tion which will bring a bout the unification of China. 
The United States and the other United Nations have 
recognized the present National Government of the Republic 
of China as the only legal government in China. It is the 
proper instrument to achieve the ob jectives of a unified 
China. 
The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo 
Declaration in 1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of last 
July and by the Sino-Soviet treaty and agreements of 
August 1945 1/ are all cammitt&d to the liberation of 
China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. 
These a greements were made with the National Government or 
the Republic of China. 
!n continuation of the constant and close collaboration 
with the National Government or the Republic of China in 
t he prosecutlon of this war , in consonance with the Potsdam 
Declaration. and toremove possibility of Japanese i nflu-
ence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a 
def inite obligation in the disarmament and evacuat ion of 
the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United States haa 
been assisting and will continue to assist t he National 
Government of the Republlc of China in effecting the dis-
armament and evacuation of Japanese troop• in the liberated 
areas. The United States Marines are in north China for 
t hat purpose . 
The United St~tes recognizes and will continue to 
reco gnize the National Government of China and cooperate 
with it in international affairs and specifically in 
eliminating Japanese lnfluences from China. The United 
States is convinced that a prompt arrangement for a 
cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective 
achievement of this end. The Unites States support will 
not extend to United States military intervention to 
influence the course of any Chinese internal strife ••• 
The United States has already been ccmpelled to pay 
a great price to restore the peace which was first broken 
by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The Maintenance of 
peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, i:f not frustrated, 
unless Jap anese in:fluence in China is wholly removed and 
unless China takes her place as a unified, democratic, and 
peace:ful nation. This is the purpose o:f the maintenance 
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ror the time being of United States mi l itary and naval 
for ces in China. 
The United States is cog_ntzant that the present Nat ional 
Government or China is a "one-party government" and be -
lieves that peace, unity , and democrati c ref orm i n China 
will be furthered if the basis of this Government is 
broadened to include other political e lements in the 
countr y . Hence , the United Stat es str ongly advocates that 
the nati onal conference of representatives of ma jor 
pol itical elements in the country agree upon arrangement s 
which would give those elements a fair and effec tive 
representation in the Chinese National Government. It i s 
recognized that this would re~ire modification of the 
one- party ttpolitical tutelage established as an interim 
arrangement in the progress of the nation t oward democracy 
by the fa t her of the Chinese Republic , Dr . Sun Yat •sen . 
The existence of a utonomous armies such as that of the 
Communist Army is inconsistent with, and ac tually makes 
impossible, political unity in China. With the i nstitution 
of a broadly representative government 1 autonomous armies 
should be eliminated a s such and all a rmed f orces in China 
integrated effectively i nto the Chinese Nati onal Army . 
I n line with its oft en expressed views regarding selr-
determination, the United States Govern~ent considers tha t 
the detailed s t eps neces s ary to the achievement of poli t -
ical unity in China mus t be worked out by the Chinese 
themselves and that i ntervention by any forei gn government 
i n these matters would be inappropriate. The United States 
Government feels, however, that China has a clear respon-
sibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed 
conflict within its territory as constituting a threat t o 
worl d stability and peace - a responsibility whi ch is 
s hared by t he Nat ional Government and all Chinese pol it-
ical and mill tary groups. 
As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines 
described a bove, the United States would be prepared to 
assis t the National Government i n every reasonable way to 
rehabi l i tate · the country, improve the agrarian and indus -
trial economy , and establish a military organization capable 
of discharging Chi na•s national and international resp onsi-
bilities for the mai ntenan ce of peace and order . In 
furtherance of such ass i s tance, it woul d be prepared to 
give favorable considerati on t o Chinese requests for 
credits and loans unde r reasonable conditions f or pro jects 
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which would contribute toward the development of a healthy 
economy throughout China and healthy trade relations be-
tween China and the United States. 
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Appendix C 
AGREEMENT ON TERMS FOR ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION 
.- I NTO THE WAR AGAI NST JAPAN , SIGNED AT YALTA, 
FEBRUARY 11, 194S ~ RELEASED SI WLTANEOUSLY 
IN LONDON, ~OSCOW AND WASHINGTON, 
FEBRUARY 11, 1946 . 
The leaders of the three Great Power s - the Soviet Union , 
·. t he United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed 
t ha t in two or three months after Germany has surrendered 
and the war i n Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall 
enter i n to the war a gainst Japan on the side of the Allies 
on condition that: 
(1) The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the 
Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved. 
(2) The former r ights· of Russia violated by the 
treacherous attack of Japan i n 1904 shall be re-
s tored, viz: 
(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well 
as all the islands adjacent to it shall be 
returned to the Soviet Union. 
(b) The commerci al port of Darien shall be 
internationalized, the preeminent interests 
of the Soviet Union i n this part being 
safeguarded i n the lease of Port Art hur as 
a naval base of t he U. s.s . R. restored. 
(c) The Chinese Eastern Railroad and the 
South Manchuria Railroad which provides an 
outlet to Dar ien s hall be jointly operated 
by the establishment of a joint Soviet-
Chinese company, it being understood that 
the preeminent interes t of t he Soviet 
Union shall be safeguar ded and that China 
shall retain full sovereignty i n Manchuria. 
_ _j 
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(3) The Kureli Islands shall be handed ov·er to 
the Soviet Union, It is understood that the agreements 
concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads 
referred to a bove will require concurrence of General-
issimo Chiang Kai-shek . The President will take 
measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice 
from Marshall Stalin . 
The heads of the three great powers have a greed that t hese 
claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled 
after Japan has been defeated. 
For its part, the Sovie t Union expresses its readi ness 
to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of 
friendshi p and alliance between the U.s.s .R .. and China in 
order to render assistance to China with its armed forces 
for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke .. 
103 
Appendix D 
THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY - August 26, 1945 
The treaty provided fo r joint action to render i mpossible 
the repet ition of a ggression and t he breaking of the peace by 
1 Japan . 
I 
I 
It called for non-interference in the internal aff airs 
of the res ective countries, and economic aid in the pos t ar 
I period . The a greements to i mplement the part provided t at: 
(1) the Chi nese Eastern and South ~anchurian 
railways are to be j ointly operated , 
I 
(2) the harbor of Port Arthur is to be used 
jointly as a nava l base, 
(3) the anchurian city of Darien is to be 
established as a free port open to all 
nations, but adminis tered by China, 
<4> Chinese s overeignty i n Manchuria and in 
Sinkiang Province was reaffirmed by the 
Soviet Union, 
(5) and it was a greed that the i ndependence 
of the Outer Mongolian Republic to be decided 
by plebiscite would be recognized by the 
Chinese. 
(6) The Soviet Union p ledged moral and 
military assistance to the Nat i onal 
Government as the Central Government of 
China. 
The treaty did not provide a solution to the i nternal 
prob lems in China. 
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Appendix E 
EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, 
PRESIDENT TRUY.AN tS SPEC IAL ENVOY TO CHINA, 
JA1IDARY 7, 1947 • 1/ 
"The salvation of the situation as I see it would 
be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the 
government and in the minority parties , a sp lendid 
group of men , but ho as yet lack t he poli tical po er 
to exer ci se a controlling influence. Successful ac ti on 
on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai -shek would , I believe , lead to unity through 
good government. 
In fact, the National Assembl y has ad opted s 
democratic cons t itution,,,,. It remains to be seen to 
what extant t he Qgye rnme11twill give substance to the 
form by a genuine welcome of all groups ac tively to 
s hare in the resp onsibility of government ••••• The 
amount of representation accorded to liberals and to 
non-Kuomintan members Wi ll be significant ••••• I f 
the termination of one-party rule is to be a reality, 
the Kuomintang should cease to receive financial 
support from the Government . 11 
!7 Vital Speecfies .. Complete context of General ~arshall•s 
statement on the "Situation In .Asia" appears on 
P • 226, Vol. 13, 1946-1947• 
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Appendix F 
ANALYSIS OF WHITE PAPER ON CHINA 
The State Department released the ~hite Paper on China, 
August 5, 1949· The report discusses General Stillwell and 
Chiang Kai-shek, General Hurley•s mission and the Yalta 
1/ 
agreement.- Commenting on the Yalta agreement between 
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin to make large concessions to 
Russia in Manchuria, the reports admit that it was unfortunate 
that commitments undertaken in the name of China were not made 
known to the Chinese government . It adds that such commit-
menta were necessary in order to secure Soviet participation 
in the war with .Japan. It points out that at the time the 
atomic bomb was not an assured possibility and the potential-
! ties of the Japanese Army in Manchuria seemed large. The 
paper also includes the recommendations made by General 
v Wedemeyer after his mission to China. The Wedemeyer report 
has been suppressed since 1947 because of its advice that 
Manchuria should be placed under trusteeship of the Soviet 
Union, Great Britain, China, France and the United States. 
The State Department feels that such a recommendation, which 
hinted at dismemberment of China, woul d have been detrimental 
to Chinese morale if it had been published. The paper places 
United States grants and credits to China since V.J. day at 
$2,007,700,000. General Hurley ts letter of resignation from 
1/ Appendix G. 
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his mission to China appears as an annex to the report~ The 
letter charges opposition to his efforts i n China by career 
members of the State Department , whom he claimed pursued a 
friendly policy with the Chinese Communist forces. 
On the day, December 15, that Truman delivered his 
di rec ti ve to Marshall, he published a statement in which he 
pledged that "United States support would not extend to 
United States military intervention to influence the course 
. 3/ 
of any Chinese internal strife.'*- He let it be known , how-
ever, that United States f orces and transport facilities were 
being employed to help the Nationali.st government in the dis-
armament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated 
area. These activities embraced Manchuria, where Chiang 
Kai-shek was especially eager to get the advantage ahead of 
the Chinese communists. 
This joint American-Chinese Nationalist adventure was 
undertaken despite warnings from General Wedemeyer who had 
succeeded Stillwell . Wedemeyer advised Chiang Kai -shek to 
consolidate his position in South China and come to an 
agreement with hie adversaries before trying to occupy the 
North . Wedemeyer's final judgment was that Manchuria should 
be placed under a joint British-American-Russian trusteeship 
to await time for National gov·ernment to become stable and 
.assume control . This recommendation was rejected . 
1/ Appendix B 
107 
======~~~~-~~=-============================================================~==~===-==== 
108 
----=.1--=--===c==-=====-==-=--=======-==J\=L=----=-=-==-
I n February 1945, the question of Manchuria had been 
~ 
raised a t the Yalta Confer ence. From .this conference be-
tween Roosevelt and Stalin there emerged a written a greement 
whereby the United States was to support the restoration of 
Russia•s pre-1904 rights in Manchur i a, subject only to the 
i nternationalization of the commercial port of Darien . The 
a greement underscored the npreeminent interests " of the 
Soviet Union in Manchuria ~ithout attempting to define them 
and acknowledging that the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek 
would be necessary and nthe Pres ident will t ake measures in 
order t o obtain this concurrence on advi ce from Marshall 
Stalin . n The White Paper gi ves no hi nt as to how Roosevelt 
went about obtaining t he Generalissimo ts concurrence . T. v. 
Soong si gned the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Ji1ri endship and 
2.1 Alliance August 14, 1945 . Thi s treaty underwrote "the Yalta 
agreement . 
~ Appendix C 2/ Appendix D 
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Appendix G 
EXCERPTS FROM GENERAL WEDEMEYER tS REPORT 1947 
!I 
WHITE PAPER ON CHINA 
Appendix A 
The Chinese government•s position in Manchuria has been 
seriously weakened by Soviet actions. I n s pite of the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of 1945 £/and its related documents, the Soviet 
Union has hindered the efforts of the Chinese Government to 
restore its control over Manchuria, and has not given the 
''moral support and aid in mill ta.ry aupplies and other matet•ial 
resources" provided for in these documents and has not per-
mitted the Chinese Government .freely to take over t he civil 
administration of Darien and the Po:rt Arthur area. Rather, 
the Soviet Union has assisted the Chinese Communists in 
Manchuria by the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
and by making available, either directly or indirectly, large 
quanti ties of surrendered Japanese mill tary equipm.ent. So1riet 
machinations in western Sinkiang and among the Mongols have 
further embarrassed the Chinese Government . In brief, the 
Soviet Union has given no indications of any effort to assist 
the Chinese Government and has, instead, taken action which 
has aided the Chinese Communists in Manchuria . The result 
has been to strengthen the Chinese Communists position in 
Manchuria, with political, economic and military repercussions 
on the National Government•s position both in Manchuria and 
China proper , and to make more difficult the attainment of 
peace and stability in China . 
To advise at this time a policy of "no assistance" to 
China would suggest the withdrawal of the United States 
Military and Naval Advisory groups from China and it would be 
e quivalent to cutting the ground from under the feet of the 
Chinese Government . Removal of American assistance without 
removal of Soviet assistance , would certainly lay the country 
apen to eventual Communist domination. It would have 
repercussions in other parts o£ Asia, would lower American 
prestige in the Far East and would make easier the spread of 
Soviet i nfluence and Soviet political expansion not only in 
Asia but other areas of the world . 
1/ Current History, September 1949. Text of the controversial 
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It is possible that the adoption of a "wait and see'• 
policy would lead to the Generalissimo •s finally carrying out 
genuine reforms which in turn would enable the United States 
to extend effective aid and which t .hemsel ves would furnish 
the best answer to the challenge of Communism . Because of an 
inevitable time lag in its results, however , such a policy 
would permit for an appreciable time the continuation of the 
process of National Government di sintegration. At some stage 
of the disintegration the authority and control of the Nationa 
Government might become so weak and restricted that separatist 
movements would occur in various areas now under government 
control. At this point conceivably t here might emerge a middle 
group which would be able to establish a mod icum of stabillty 
in the areas under its control. It v•ould then be possible for 
the United States to extend support, both moral and material, 
to any such group or combination of groups which give indica-
tion of ability to consolidate control over sizable portions 
of the country and whose policies would be compatible with our 
own. This, however, represents conjecture regarding a possi-
ble future course of events in China . There is the f'..1rther 
possibility that such a ~olicy would result a t some point in 
the Generalissimo 's seeking a compromise with the Chinese 
Communists, although it is likely that he would not do ao 
until his position became so weak that the Communists woul d 
accept a settlement only on terms assuring them a dominant 
position in the government . At worst , under a process of con-
tinued National Government disintegration, it may be expected 
that there would be a long period of disturbance verging on 
chaos, at the end of which the Chinese Communists would 
emerge as the dominant group oriented toward the Soviet Union . 
Reforms to improve t he internal political situation shoul 
in general include measures which would (a) make for efficient 
government, (b) protect the basic freedom of the people f rom 
arbitrary acts of repression, (c) remove civil administration 
from military control, and (d) contr ibute to the welfare of 
the people. These measures might include, inter alia, reforms 
such as the following: Comp lete separation-or-the-KUomintang 
from the government and theemergence of the Generalissimo as 
the leader of the nation r ather than of the party; reorgani-
zation of the National Government , including both the Executiv 
Yuan and the State Council to ensure participation by respon-
sible Chinese without regard .to party affiliations; a clear 
cut delegation of responsibility in the government to increase 
efficiency, foster initiative, prevent the domination of' 
governmental affairs and policies by one person and to en-
courage entry into government service bf capable and progres -
,--
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sive Chinese now unwilling to serve in the government; the 
strengthening of t he Control Yuan to ensure the removal and 
punishment of corrupt. officials; t he abolition or the exis ting 
secret police system; the cessation of arrests of civilians 
by milH;ary organs; the prompt and public trial of persons 
arrested and the full exerc ise of the ri ght of habeas corpus; 
the cessation of the use of force and intimidation a ainst 
teachers and students and the reinstatement of university 
professors and students diemissed solely for their poli tical 
views; the carrying out of a land reform program .~hich would 
lighten the burden of usury and taxation on the peasan ts as 
well as provide him land; decentraliaation of goverr~ental 
powers to permit more local autonomy end local participation 
in adminis trati on; removal of military officers from posts in 
civil government while on active status; and publication of' 
complete inforn1ation regarding fiscal policies and their 
i mplementation and of detailed data covering government revenue 
and expenditures, i ncluding national, provincial and municipal 
budgets. 
Appendix D 
I t is recommended: 
That the United States provide as early as practicable 
moral, advisory and material support to China in order to 
prevent :Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite, to bolster 
oppoai tion to Cow ..rrmnist expansion , and to contribute to t he 
gradual development of stability in China. 
That China be advised to request tbe United Sta tes to 
take immediate steps to bring about a cessation of hostilities 
in Manchuria and request that Manchuria be placed under a 
five-power guardianship , or, failing that, under a trusteeship 
in accordance with the United Nations' charter . 
That China be advised to take steps to reduce its mili-
tary expenditures in the national budget and a t the same time 
increase the effectiveness and e ffi ciency of the military 
establishments. 
That China give continuing evidence that urgently re-
quired military reforms are being implemented. 
That China, with the advice and support of the United 
States, develop and implement a sound program of equipment 
' and improved logistical s upport . 
I 
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That arrangements be made whereby China can purchase 
military equipment and supplies (particularly motor mainte -
nance parts) from the United States. 
That China be assisted in her efforts to obtain 
ammunition immediately. 
That the 8 1/3 Air Group Proeram be completed promptly 
and that consideration be given to expansion of its air 
transport. 
That the China Mapping Program be extended in scope 
where practicable. 
That the program for transfer of ships to China be com-
pleted as rapidly as China is able to utilize them effectively . 
That the occupation of Japan program be dropped , but 
only with the concurrence of the National Government of China . 
That military advice and supervi sion be extended in scope 
to include field forces, tr ining cen ters and particularly 
logisti cal a gencies. 
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STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY - JANUARY 1950 1/ 
When, in 1945, the Chinese people emerged from the ordeal 
of a Japanese conquest, they were determined upon change and 
reform. The Nationalist Government had control over most of 
the country. It had prodigious American aid and the wise 
counsel of General Marshall. It had the diplomatic support 
of the Great Powers. In spite of all these advantages, the 
Nati onalist Government lost the allegiance of the Chinese 
people, because it did not use that aid, support, and advice 
to restore the .confidence of the people in its leadership . 
This was a situation made to order for Communism . The 
Nationalist Government disintegrated, its armies melted away ; 
Chinese Communists took possession of the vacuum. 
Only one&ternative course of action mi ght have saved 
China from Communism: a full-scale intervention by United 
States military forces on behalf of the Nationalist Govern-
ment. To intervene in what was then still unquestionably a 
civil war between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists 
would have meant reversing our history and our Character, 
abandoning our principles and our good name - and risking 
defeat. It would have branded the United States as an im-
perialist power in the minds of the people of Asia. It would 
have embroiled the United States iri a war in China which 
could have brought neither peace nor any real victory. 
Time and again the Chinese people have shown a capacity 
to liberate themselves by outlasting and absorbing t heir 
conquerors. Will they be able, in time, to free themselves 
from Soviet Domination? Among those who know and understand 
China there is a strong belief that the traditional pride and 
independent spirit of the Chinese people in the long run will, 
triumph over every forei gn attempt. Whether or not t hi s 
judgment turns out to be right will depend on many factors, 
both inside and outside China. It will depend on the tough-
ness of other Asian peoples in standing up for their inde-
pendence against Communist pressure. It will depend on t he 
strength we can add to their•s, and on American Example -
the k ind of examp+e we set in Korea. It will depend on the 
s peed and firmness of the United Nations in dealing with 
threats to the peace. 
We shall be deluding ourselves if we think that American 
policy can, by itself, bring about the liberation of t he 
!7 Dept. of state Publication 3972 
1 ...:. 
Chinese people or guarantee the progress of independence and 
freedom i n As ia as a whole. By our own enli ghtened choice, 
e are a part of a great coalition which is learning how to . 
mobilize the . power of free nations for peace. Our first dut y 
is to strengthen and unite t hat c oalition and to identify it 
beyond all doubt i n the minds of people as the spearhead of 
the liberal revol ution for freedom and progress. This is our 
long-range purpose as expressed in the charter of the United 
Nations. We belong to the f ree community, and our role is 
one of partnership. 
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PRESI DENTtS STATEMENT ON FORMOSA, 
J ANUARY 5, 1950 
Appendix I 
As his answer t o Republican a gi t ati ng for defense of 
t he island of Formosa - the las t stronghold of t he Chi nese 
Na t ionalis t for ces - President Truman issued a stat ement on 
January 5th barring any United States military i ntervent ion , 
aid or advice. He l imited any assistance t o e conomic re-
covery efforts now in force. 
The United States Government has alway s stood for 
good f aith i n internati onal~lations. Tradi t ional 
United St ates policy toward China, as exempl ified i n 
t he Open Door Policy, called for inter national respect 
for the territorial i ntegrity of China. 
This princi ple was recently reaff i rmed i n t he United 
Na t ions General Assembl y resolution of December 8, 1949, 
whi ch , in part, calls on all states: 
To refrai n from (a) seeking t o acquire 
s pheres of i nfl uence or to create fore i gn 
controlled regi mes withi n the territor y of 
China; (b) seeking to obtain special right s 
or pri vileges withi n t he territory of China. 
A specific appl i cation of the f oregoing pr imc iples 
i s seen i n the present situation with respect t o Formosa. 
I n t he joint declaration at Cairo on December 1, 1943 , . 
the President of t he United St ates, t he Pri me Mi n i s ter 
of Grea t Britain and t he President of China stated t hat 
it was t heir purpmse tha t t erritories J~an held , 
stolen from China, such a s uFormosa" , should be restored 
to the Republi c of China. 
The United States was a signa t ory to the Potsdam 
Declaration of July 26, 1945, which declared that the 
terms of t he Cairo Declaration should be carried out. 
The provisions of thi s declaration ere accepted by 
Japan at the t i me of i ts surrender. 
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In keeping with these declarations , Formosa was 
surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai - shek and for 
the past four years t he United States and the other 
allied powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese 
authority over the i sland . 
The United States has no predatory designs on 
Formosa or any other Chinese territory . The United 
States has no desire to obtain special rights or 
privileges or to est~blish military bases on Formosa 
at this time . Nor does it have any intention of 
utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present 
situation . The United States Government will not 
pursue a course that will lead to involvement in the 
civil conflict in China. 
Similarly, the United States Government ill not 
provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on 
Formosa . In the vie of the United States Government, 
the resources on Formosa are ad4!tquate to enable them 
to obtain the item.s hich they might consider necessary 
for the defense of the island . The United States 
Government proposes to continue under existing legis-
lative authority the present E. c . .A. program of 
economic assistance . 
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SINO-SOVIET AGREEMENT 1950 
On February 141 1950 the Soviet Union and the Communist 
People 's Republic of China signed a treaty of friendship and 
alliance. At the same time two agreements were entered into 
extending credit to the new Chinese government and settling 
the future status of the Changchun Railway and t he Ports of 
Darien and Port Arthur. The text of a communique containing 
the treaty and a greements as it was learned in the United 
States by the Soviet Monitor 
In the course of a recent period , negotiations 
have taken place in Mosco between J . v. Stalin, Chair -
man of the Council of Ministers of the U.S .S.R. and 
A. Y. Vishinsky, U.s.s.R. Minister of Foreign Relations, 
on the one hand , and ~ . Mao Tee-tung of the Chinese 
People•s Republic and Mr . Chou En-lai, Premier of the 
State ' Administrative Council and Forei gn U.nister of · 
the People •s Republic, on the other hand, during which 
important political and economic problems on relat ions 
between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People' s Republic 
wei•e discussed . 
The ne gotiations,which took place in an atmosphere 
of cordiality and friendly mutual understanding , con-
firmed the striving of both sides to strengthen in every 
way and to develop relati ons of friendship and co-opera-
tion between them as well as their desire to co-operate 
for the purpose of ~apanteeing general peace and 
security of the nations . The negotiations ended by the 
signing in the K~emlin# February 14, 1950, of 
1. A Treaty of Friendship, .. Alliance and Mntual 
Aid between the Soviet Union and t h e Chinese 
People's Republic . 
2. Agreements on the Chinese Changchun Railway , 
Port Arthur and Darien , under which, after the 
signing of the peace treaty 'IJ, i t h Japan , the 
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Chinese Changchun Railway will pass into complete 
ownership of the Chinese Peoplets Republic, hile 
Soviet troops will be ithdra n from Port Arthur . 
3 · Agreement by which the Government of the 
U.s . s . R. will gi ve to t he Government of the 
Chinese People's Republic a long term economic 
credit for payments of deliveries of industrial 
and railway equipment from the u . s . s.-R. -
300 , 000,000 loan. Treaty effective 30 years. 
Notes ~ere exchanged during the signing or the 
treaty that a corresponding treaty and a greement con-
cluded August 14 , 1945 !/ bet een China and t he 
Soviet Union have become invalid and that both govern-
ments affirm complete guarantee of the independent 
status of the Mongolian People •s Republic as a result 
of the referendum of 1945 and the establishment with 
her of diplomatic relations by the Chinese People ' s 
Republic . 
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